Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Prevention vs. TreatmentWhat's the Right Balance?$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Halley S. Faust and Paul T. Menzel

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199837373

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199837373.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 19 April 2019

Treatment and Prevention

Treatment and Prevention

What Do We Owe Each Other?

Chapter:
8 Treatment and Prevention
Source:
Prevention vs. Treatment
Author(s):

Norman Daniels

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199837373.003.0008

Without focusing on the details of specific health systems, this chapter considers what we owe each other with regard to promoting and restoring health and what this means for the balance between prevention and treatment. I argue that we have robust obligations both with regard to prevention and treatment, though the specifics of what is owed depend on decisions about how to fit a reasonable array of such services within resource limits. Among our preventive obligations are interventions that provide incentives for adopting health regarding behaviors, though these are harder to justify on some accounts of justice than others. For example, luck egalitarianism provides no justification for such incentives, though a Rawlsian account does. The chapter concludes by considering whether the fact that risk is more concentrated in some people than others, say in identified victims rather than statistical ones, is morally relevant to giving them some priority. I claim that concentration of risk is morally relevant under some conditions and that this may favor identified over statistical victims to the extent that risk concentration is the relevant contrast between them.

Keywords:   concentration of risk, moral relevance, luck egalitarianism, prevention, treatment, identified victims, statistical victims, incentives

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .