The claim that temporal contents may be the semantic values of truth-evaluable sentences is relatively uncontroversial. Eternalists such as Robert Stalnaker, David Lewis, Mark Richard, Nathan Salmon, and Jason Stanley have all defended this claim. However, these eternalists prefer to reserve the term ‘proposition’ for eternal content. The most controversial claims made by temporalists are (i) that we may stand in belief relations to temporal contents, (ii) that temporal contents can be the objects of agreement and disagreement and (iii) that successful communication may involve temporal contents. I defend the first claim in this chapter and the second and third claims in the subsequent chapter.
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