Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Transient TruthsAn Essay in the Metaphysics of Propositions$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Berit Brogaard

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199796908

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199796908.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 21 June 2018

Reporting Belief

Reporting Belief

Chapter:
(p.30) 2 Reporting Belief
Source:
Transient Truths
Author(s):

Berit Brogaard

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199796908.003.0002

The claim that temporal contents may be the semantic values of truth-evaluable sentences is relatively uncontroversial. Eternalists such as Robert Stalnaker, David Lewis, Mark Richard, Nathan Salmon, and Jason Stanley have all defended this claim. However, these eternalists prefer to reserve the term ‘proposition’ for eternal content. The most controversial claims made by temporalists are (i) that we may stand in belief relations to temporal contents, (ii) that temporal contents can be the objects of agreement and disagreement and (iii) that successful communication may involve temporal contents. I defend the first claim in this chapter and the second and third claims in the subsequent chapter.

Keywords:   attitude reports, belief reports, the object of belief, belief De Se, belief retention, storing belief contents, memory

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .