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Testimony, Trust, and Authority$

Benjamin McMyler

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199794331

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199794331.001.0001

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(p.171) References

Source:
Testimony, Trust, and Authority
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Oxford University Press

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