Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
The Future of Punishment$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Thomas A. Nadelhoffer

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199779208

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199779208.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2017. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 21 October 2017

The Mind, the Brain, and the Law

The Mind, the Brain, and the Law

Chapter:
(p.193) 9 The Mind, the Brain, and the Law
Source:
The Future of Punishment
Author(s):

Thomas Nadelhoffer

Dena Gromet

Geoffrey Goodwin

Eddy Nahmias

Chandra Sripada

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199779208.003.0009

In this chapter, we explore the potential influence that advances in neuroscience may have on legal decision makers and present the findings from some recent studies that probe folk intuitions concerning the relationships among neuroscience, agency, responsibility, and mental illness. We first familiarize the reader with some of the early research in experimental philosophy on people's intuitions about agency and responsibility. Then, we focus on a more specific issue—namely, whether people respond to explanations of human behavior framed in neuroscientific terms differently than they respond to explanations framed in more traditional folk psychological terms. Next, we discuss some new findings which suggest that explanations of criminal behavior that are couched in neural terms appear to make people less punitive than explanations couched in mental terms, especially in the context of mental illness. Finally, we offer what we take to be the best explanation of these differences in people's intuitions—namely, when people are presented with neural explanations of human behavior, they tend to think that the agent's “deep self” (the values and beliefs the agent identifies with) is somehow left out of the causal loop or bypassed, which in turn mitigates the agent's responsibility.

Keywords:   free will, responsibility, criminal law, neuroscience, folk intuitions

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .