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Sidgwickian Ethics$
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David Phillips

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199778911

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199778911.001.0001

Sidgwick's Metaethics

Chapter:
(p.10) 2 Sidgwick's Metaethics
Source:
Sidgwickian Ethics
Author(s):

David Phillips

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199778911.003.0002

I argue that non-naturalism is the core of Sidgwick's metaethical position; that it represents a fundamental commitment of his, in that he draws from it epistemological implications central to his own distinctive ethical views; that his case for it is better than Moore's more famous case, in Principia 1, and reflects a proper estimation of the way to argue for non-naturalism; that there is an interesting route from Sidgwick to error theory, of which Mackie was aware; and that these claims together mean Sidgwick's work deserves much more attention and recognition in metaethics than it has hitherto received.

Keywords:   metaethics, Moore, Mackie, error theory, Shaver

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