(p.225) Appendix A: Statistical Model Estimates
(p.225) Appendix A: Statistical Model Estimates
Chapter 3
Table A3.1. Individual-Level Antecedents of Partisan Ambivalence
Conflicting Evaluations | Consistent Evaluations | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
% Change | Lower | Upper | % Change | Lower | Upper | |
Unemployed | 26.14 | 9.09 | 44.99 | –7.91 | –15.93 | 0.23 |
Contact w/parties | 3.08 | –5.23 | 12.24 | 2.00 | –2.66 | 6.91 |
Group feelings | 90.62 | 78.34 | 101.74 | –26.78 | –29.13 | –24.27 |
Moral traditionalism | 20.15 | 10.71 | 30.67 | –6.77 | –10.81 | –2.92 |
Egalitarianism | 39.12 | 24.53 | 55.34 | –25.19 | –29.73 | –20.17 |
Worried job | –5.10 | –9.94 | 0.07 | 3.64 | 0.58 | 6.91 |
House contact | 6.74 | –1.47 | 16.09 | 1.14 | –3.47 | 5.85 |
Discuss politics | 11.36 | –0.19 | 23.92 | 3.43 | –2.67 | 9.53 |
Keep up with costs | 26.84 | 13.95 | 41.82 | –11.57 | –16.90 | –6.02 |
Notes. ANES Cumulative File, 1980–2004. Entries are negative binomial estimates of the percent change in each component of partisan ambivalence, with confidence bounds, for a change in the respective variable from its 5th to its 95th percentile. This table is constructed from multiple models. See the text for more details on the procedure.
(p.226) Chapter 4
Table A4.1. Policy Preferences as a Function of Partisanship, 2008 ANES Panel Study
Variable | B | SE | p |
---|---|---|---|
Lagged preference | .52 | .01 | .00 |
Age | –.01 | .03 | .65 |
Male | .02 | .01 | .08 |
Black | –.05 | .03 | .07 |
Education | –.01 | .02 | .59 |
Income | .03 | .03 | .28 |
Unemployed | –.01 | .02 | .47 |
Republican | –.15 | .05 | .00 |
Strength | –.01 | .02 | .49 |
Interest | –.05 | .04 | .13 |
Sophistication | –.10 | .04 | .01 |
Consistent | –.05 | .03 | .12 |
Conflicting | .05 | .05 | .34 |
Rep × Strength | .06 | .03 | .06 |
Rep × Interest | .12 | .05 | .01 |
Rep × Sophistication | .13 | .05 | .01 |
Rep × Consistent | .17 | .05 | .00 |
Rep × Conflicting | –.06 | .06 | .32 |
Constant | .27 | .04 | .00 |
SD (Constant) | .07 | .01 | |
N | 4,159 | ||
Respondents | 520 |
Notes. ANES 2008 panel. Entries are restricted maximum likelihood coefficients and standard errors. The intercept is modeled as a random variable that varies by respondent. The dependent variable is measured in October, and lagged preferences are measured in January. Partisan identification, strength, and political interest are measured in January, while ambivalence and sophistication are measured in February. Model also includes fixed effects for issue (not shown).
Table A4.2. Economic Preferences as a Function of Partisanship and Income, 2008 ANES Panel Study
Variable | B | SE | p |
---|---|---|---|
Lagged preference | .58 | .02 | .00 |
Age | –.01 | .04 | .78 |
Male | .03 | .02 | .04 |
Black | –.01 | .04 | .85 |
Education | .04 | .03 | .16 |
Income | .34 | .14 | .02 |
Unemployed | .01 | .03 | .74 |
Republican | –.15 | .06 | .02 |
Strength | –.08 | .07 | .24 |
Interest | .00 | .10 | .98 |
Sophistication | –.07 | .11 | .53 |
Consistent | .11 | .09 | .26 |
Conflicting | .18 | .14 | .21 |
Rep x Strength | .04 | .04 | .38 |
Rep x Interest | .14 | .07 | .04 |
Rep x Sophistication | .07 | .07 | .30 |
Rep x Consistent | .27 | .07 | .00 |
Rep x Conflicting | –.02 | .09 | .80 |
Income x Strength | .12 | .10 | .22 |
Income x Interest | –.13 | .15 | .37 |
Income x Sophistication | .01 | .16 | .97 |
Income x Consistent | –.33 | .15 | .02 |
Income x Conflicting | –.14 | .21 | .50 |
Constant | .00 | .10 | 1.00 |
SD (Constant) | .10 | .01 | |
N | 1,559 | ||
Respondents | 520 |
Notes. ANES 2008 panel. Entries are restricted maximum likelihood coefficients and standard errors. The intercept is modeled as a random variable that varies by respondent. The dependent variable is measured in October, and lagged preferences are measured in January. Partisan identification, strength, and political interest are measured in January, while ambivalence and sophistication are measured in February. Model also includes fixed effects for issue (not shown).
Table A4.3. Economic Preferences as a Function of Partisanship and Personal Economic Circumstances, 1992–1994 ANES Panel Study
Variable | B | SE | p |
---|---|---|---|
Lagged preferences | .33 | .06 | .00 |
Age | –.03 | .04 | .47 |
Male | .03 | .02 | .19 |
Black | –.10 | .03 | .00 |
Education | –.06 | .04 | .08 |
Income | .10 | .04 | .01 |
Republican | .01 | .06 | .93 |
Personal economic | .05 | .14 | .71 |
Strength | –.02 | .06 | .67 |
Interest | .06 | .08 | .51 |
Sophistication | –.04 | .09 | .69 |
Consistent | .07 | .07 | .32 |
Conflicting | –.07 | .05 | .18 |
Rep x Strength | .10 | .05 | .03 |
Rep x Interest | –.03 | .06 | .62 |
Rep x Sophistication | .07 | .07 | .35 |
Rep x Consistent | .11 | .05 | .04 |
Rep x Conflicting | –.09 | .04 | .03 |
Personal Ec. x Strength | .00 | .10 | .99 |
Personal Ec. x Interest | .00 | .14 | .98 |
Personal Ec. x Sophistication | –.03 | .14 | .84 |
Personal Ec. x Consistent | –.11 | .10 | .29 |
Personal Ec. x Conflicting | .20 | .08 | .02 |
Constant | .29 | .09 | .00 |
R² | .43 | ||
N | 434 |
Notes. ANES 1992–1994 panel. Entries are OLS coefficients and robust standard errors. Dependent variable is measured in 1994. All independent variables are measured in 1992.
(p.229) Chapter 5
Table A5.1. Bias and Responsiveness in Economic Retrospections, 1980–2004
Variable | Δ in Unemployment | GDP Growth | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
B | SE | p | B | SE | p | |
Age | .00 | .01 | .73 | .00 | .01 | .74 |
Female | –.04 | .01 | .00 | –.04 | .01 | .00 |
Black | –.04 | .01 | .00 | –.04 | .01 | .00 |
Education | .05 | .01 | .00 | .05 | .01 | .00 |
Income | .02 | .01 | .12 | .02 | .01 | .12 |
Unemployed | –.03 | .01 | .01 | –.03 | .01 | .01 |
Partisan strength | –.03 | .01 | .00 | –.04 | .01 | .00 |
Interest | –.04 | .01 | .01 | –.05 | .02 | .01 |
Sophistication | –.01 | .01 | .52 | –.06 | .02 | .00 |
Conflicting | .11 | .03 | .00 | .01 | .04 | .81 |
Consistent | –.12 | .02 | .00 | –.09 | .03 | .00 |
In-Party | –.02 | .01 | .09 | –.02 | .01 | .08 |
In-Party x Strength | .08 | .01 | .00 | .08 | .01 | .00 |
In-Party x Interest | .07 | .02 | .00 | .07 | .02 | .00 |
In-Party x Sophistication | .03 | .02 | .08 | .03 | .02 | .07 |
In-Party x Conflicting | –.29 | .05 | .00 | –.29 | .04 | .00 |
In-Party x Consistent | .26 | .03 | .00 | .25 | .03 | .00 |
Change in Economy | –.06 | .02 | .01 | .03 | .01 | .01 |
Change x Strength | –.01 | .01 | .30 | .00 | .00 | .27 |
Change x Interest | –.01 | .01 | .29 | .00 | .00 | .33 |
Change x Sophistication | –.04 | .01 | .00 | .02 | .00 | .00 |
Change x Conflicting | –.07 | .02 | .00 | .03 | .01 | .00 |
Change x Consistent | .02 | .01 | .16 | –.01 | .01 | .10 |
Constant | .40 | .03 | .00 | .32 | .04 | .00 |
SD intercept | .08 | .02 | .00 | .08 | .02 | .00 |
SD residuals | .23 | .00 | .00 | .23 | .00 | .00 |
N | 8,159 | 8,159 | ||||
Years | 11 | 11 |
Notes. Data from the ANES cumulative file, 1980–2004; dependent variable is economic retrospections (higher values = “better”); models include random intercepts for year and are estimated with a normal link function.
Table A5.2. Economic Retrospections in the 2008 Presidential Election
Variable | B | SE | p |
---|---|---|---|
Lagged retrospection | .24 | .02 | .00 |
Age | .01 | .02 | .50 |
Male | .00 | .01 | .89 |
Black | –.01 | .02 | .66 |
Education | –.03 | .02 | .16 |
Income | .00 | .02 | .82 |
Republican | .01 | .04 | .74 |
Strength | .01 | .02 | .71 |
Interest | –.01 | .03 | .67 |
Sophistication | –.01 | .03 | .71 |
Consistent | .02 | .03 | .46 |
Conflicting | .00 | .04 | .94 |
Rep x Strength | –.01 | .02 | .83 |
Rep x Interest | .05 | .04 | .23 |
Rep x Sophistication | .04 | .04 | .37 |
Rep x Consistent | .03 | .04 | .46 |
Rep x Conflicting | –.11 | .05 | .03 |
Constant | –.01 | .03 | .81 |
R² | .21 | ||
N | 981 |
Notes. ANES 2008 panel. Entries are OLS coefficients and robust standard errors. Dependent variable is measured in October (higher values = “gotten better”). Lagged retrospections are measured in January. Partisan identification, strength, and political interest are measured in January, while ambivalence and sophistication are measured in February.
Table A5.3. Accuracy of Unemployment Retrospections During Reagan’s Presidency
Democrats | Republicans | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Variable | B | SE | p | B | SE | p |
Age | –.39 | .25 | .12 | –.22 | .32 | .48 |
Male | .05 | .10 | .65 | .47 | .13 | .00 |
Black | –.21 | .12 | .08 | –.40 | .28 | .16 |
Education | .41 | .21 | .06 | .21 | .29 | .46 |
Income | .22 | .19 | .26 | .45 | .26 | .08 |
Unemployed | –.29 | .19 | .13 | –.07 | .33 | .82 |
Strength | –.11 | .12 | .36 | .37 | .16 | .02 |
Interest | –.14 | .14 | .32 | .11 | .19 | .58 |
Sophistication | .61 | .23 | .01 | .79 | .31 | .01 |
Consistent | –.48 | .19 | .01 | .23 | .30 | .45 |
Conflicting | 1.14 | .36 | .00 | –.35 | .32 | .28 |
Cut 1 | –.23 | .17 | –.30 | .22 | ||
Cut 2 | .45 | .17 | .41 | .22 | ||
Pseudo-R² | .05 | .10 | ||||
N | 646 | 549 |
Notes. 1988 ANES. Entries are ordered probit coefficients and standard errors. Higher values of dependent variable indicate more positive retrospections.
Table A5.4. Accuracy of Inflation Retrospections During Reagan’s Presidency
Variable | Democrats | Republicans | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
B | SE | p | B | SE | p | |
Age | .21 | .25 | .40 | –.63 | .29 | .03 |
Male | .28 | .10 | .01 | .42 | .11 | .00 |
Black | .10 | .12 | .39 | .20 | .28 | .48 |
Education | .55 | .21 | .01 | .28 | .26 | .27 |
Income | .09 | .19 | .64 | .25 | .22 | .26 |
Unemployed | –.29 | .20 | .14 | –.23 | .31 | .47 |
Strength | –.10 | .12 | .40 | .13 | .14 | .37 |
Interest | –.27 | .14 | .06 | –.07 | .18 | .71 |
Sophistication | .86 | .23 | .00 | 1.26 | .28 | .00 |
Consistent | –.37 | .20 | .06 | .87 | .27 | .00 |
Conflicting | 1.51 | .35 | .00 | –.01 | .29 | .96 |
Cut 1 | .53 | .17 | .24 | .20 | ||
Cut 2 | 1.35 | .18 | 1.01 | .20 | ||
Pseudo-R² | .08 | .13 | ||||
N | 653 | 548 |
Notes. 1988 ANES. Entries are ordered probit coefficients and standard errors. Higher values of dependent variable indicate more positive retrospections.
Table A5.5. Accuracy of Deficit Retrospections During Clinton’s Presidency
Variable | Democrats | Republicans | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
B | SE | p | B | SE | p | |
Age | .87 | .48 | .07 | .25 | .48 | .60 |
Male | .00 | .17 | 1.00 | –.01 | .17 | .95 |
Black | –.25 | .20 | .23 | –.08 | .52 | .88 |
Education | .45 | .39 | .24 | .95 | .36 | .01 |
Income | 1.60 | .61 | .01 | .01 | .51 | .98 |
Strength | –.01 | .21 | .96 | .40 | .21 | .06 |
Interest | .34 | .25 | .17 | –.04 | .28 | .89 |
Sophistication | .94 | .41 | .02 | .43 | .41 | .30 |
Consistent | 1.03 | .39 | .01 | –1.05 | .37 | .00 |
Conflicting | .63 | .54 | .24 | .96 | .45 | .03 |
Cut 1 | .53 | .36 | .13 | .36 | ||
Cut 2 | 1.42 | .36 | .83 | .36 | ||
Pseudo-R² | .15 | .05 | ||||
N | 301 | 220 |
Notes. 2000 ANES. Entries are ordered probit coefficients and standard errors. Higher values of dependent variable indicate more positive retrospections.
Table A5.6. Accuracy of Crime Retrospections During Clinton’s Presidency
Variable | Democrats | Republicans | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
B | SE | p | B | SE | p | |
Age | –.34 | .42 | .42 | .93 | .44 | .04 |
Male | .29 | .14 | .04 | .28 | .16 | .09 |
Black | –.36 | .19 | .05 | –.02 | .49 | .97 |
Education | .58 | .31 | .06 | .31 | .34 | .36 |
Income | .41 | .43 | .34 | .24 | .47 | .61 |
Strength | .20 | .18 | .28 | .08 | .20 | .68 |
Interest | .19 | .21 | .36 | .28 | .26 | .29 |
Sophistication | 1.01 | .33 | .00 | .41 | .38 | .28 |
Consistent | .18 | .32 | .57 | –.11 | .35 | .74 |
Conflicting | .39 | .41 | .34 | .83 | .43 | .05 |
Cut 1 | .41 | .30 | .82 | .34 | ||
Cut 2 | 1.27 | .31 | 1.80 | .35 | ||
Pseudo-R² | .09 | .06 | ||||
N | 311 | 234 |
Notes. 2000 ANES. Entries are ordered probit coefficients and standard errors. Higher values of dependent variable indicate more positive retrospections.
Table A5.7. Projection and Inference in Perceptions of Presidential Candidates’ Policy Positions, 1980–2004
Variable | B | SE | p |
---|---|---|---|
Age | –.01 | .01 | .19 |
Female | .01 | .00 | .00 |
Black | .05 | .00 | .00 |
Education | –.01 | .00 | .01 |
Income | –.02 | .01 | .00 |
Candidate party | .11 | .01 | .00 |
R’s preference | .06 | .01 | .00 |
Strength | –.05 | .01 | .00 |
Interest | –.08 | .01 | .00 |
Sophistication | –.07 | .01 | .00 |
Consistent | –.17 | .01 | .00 |
Conflicting | .14 | .01 | .00 |
Party x Strength | –.01 | .00 | .06 |
Party x Interest | .06 | .01 | .00 |
Party x Sophistication | .14 | .01 | .00 |
Party x Consistent | .10 | .01 | .00 |
Party x Conflicting | .14 | .01 | .00 |
Pref. x Strength | .09 | .01 | .00 |
Pref. x Interest | .10 | .01 | .00 |
Pref. x Sophistication | –.02 | .01 | .07 |
Pref. x Consistent | .29 | .01 | .00 |
Pref. x Conflicting | –.45 | .02 | .00 |
Constant | .50 | .01 | .00 |
SD (constant) | .07 | .00 | |
N | 57,215 | ||
Respondents | 6,725 |
Notes. ANES Cumulative File, 1980–2004. Entries are restricted maximum likelihood coefficients and standard errors. “Candidate Party” represents processes of ideological inference; “R’s preference” represents projection. The intercept is modeled as a random variable which varies by respondent. Model includes fixed effects for issue, which vary by the party of the candidate being judged (not shown).
Table A5.8. Projection and Inference in Perceptions of Senators’ Roll-Call Votes, 2006
Variable | B | SE | p |
---|---|---|---|
Age | –.11 | .04 | .00 |
Male | –.01 | .01 | .51 |
Black | .06 | .03 | .02 |
Education | .00 | .03 | .99 |
Income | –.05 | .03 | .11 |
Senator’s party | .39 | .06 | .00 |
R’s policy position | .66 | .06 | .00 |
Partisan strength | –.09 | .03 | .00 |
Interest | –.71 | .04 | .00 |
Ambivalence | .00 | .04 | .98 |
Party x Strength | –.16 | .04 | .00 |
Party x Interest | 1.14 | .05 | .00 |
Party x Ambivalence | .55 | .05 | .00 |
Position x Strength | .24 | .04 | .00 |
Position x Interest | .23 | .06 | .00 |
Position x Ambivalence | –.65 | .05 | .00 |
Constant | –.12 | .05 | .01 |
Pseudo-R² | .44 | ||
N | 123,786 |
Notes. 2006 CCES. Entries are probit coefficients and standard errors. “Senator’s party” represents processes of ideological inference; “R’s policy position” represents projection. Model includes fixed effects for issue, which vary by the party of the candidate being judged (not shown).
Table A5.9. Projection and Inference in Perceptions of Presidential Candidates’ Policy Positions, 2008
Variable | B | SE | p |
---|---|---|---|
Lagged perception | .32 | .01 | .00 |
Age | .00 | .02 | .92 |
Male | –.02 | .01 | .00 |
Black | .03 | .02 | .14 |
Education | .02 | .02 | .27 |
Income | –.02 | .02 | .48 |
R’s position on issue | –.09 | .04 | .03 |
Party of candidate | –.02 | .04 | .54 |
Strength | –.01 | .03 | .61 |
Interest | –.09 | .03 | .01 |
Sophistication | –.07 | .03 | .03 |
Consistent | –.12 | .03 | .00 |
Conflicting | –.05 | .04 | .25 |
R’s x Strength | .05 | .04 | .16 |
R’s x Interest | –.02 | .04 | .60 |
R’s x Sophistication | .07 | .04 | .11 |
R’s x Consistent | .20 | .04 | .00 |
R’s x Conflicting | –.10 | .05 | .05 |
Party x Strength | –.03 | .03 | .29 |
Party x Interest | .11 | .03 | .00 |
Party x Sophistication | .09 | .03 | .01 |
Party x Consistent | .07 | .03 | .02 |
Party x Conflicting | .11 | .04 | .01 |
Constant | .43 | .04 | .00 |
SD (constant) | .05 | .01 | |
N | 6,796 | ||
Respondents | 475 |
Notes. 2008 ANES panel. Entries are restricted maximum likelihood coefficients and standard errors. The intercept is modeled as a random variable that varies by respondent. Dependent variable is respondent’s placement of the candidate in the October wave. Lagged perceptions are measured in June. Partisan identification, strength, and political interest are measured in January, while ambivalence and sophistication are measured in February. Model includes fixed effects for issue, which vary by the party of the candidate being judged (not shown).
Table A5.10. Accuracy of Presidential Perceptions, 1980–2004
Variable | B | SE | p |
---|---|---|---|
Age | –1.51 | .11 | .00 |
Female | –.30 | .05 | .00 |
Black | .32 | .07 | .00 |
Education | .59 | .09 | .00 |
Income | .26 | .09 | .00 |
Mismatched | –.19 | .10 | .06 |
Strength | .15 | .07 | .02 |
Interest | 1.13 | .10 | .00 |
Sophistication | 1.32 | .10 | .00 |
Consistent | 2.17 | .12 | .00 |
Conflicting | .40 | .18 | .02 |
Strength x Mismatch | –.45 | .09 | .00 |
Interest x Mismatch | –.59 | .14 | .00 |
Sophistication x Mismatch | –.02 | .13 | .88 |
Consistent x Mismatch | –2.02 | .17 | .00 |
Conflicting x Mismatch | 2.09 | .23 | .00 |
Constant | –.69 | .10 | .00 |
N | 32,400 | ||
Respondents | 6,935 |
Notes. ANES Cumulative File, 1980–2004. Entries are restricted maximum likelihood coefficients and standard errors. The intercept is modeled as a random variable that varies by respondent. Dependent variable is coded “1” for correctly placing the Democratic candidate to the left of the Republican. “Mismatched” is coded “1” for citizens whose own position on the issue conflicts with their party’s position. Model includes fixed effects for issue.
Table A5.11. Accuracy of Senatorial Perceptions, 2006
Variable | B | SE | P |
---|---|---|---|
Age | .23 | .03 | .00 |
Male | .23 | .01 | .00 |
Black | –.05 | .02 | .03 |
Education | .25 | .02 | .00 |
Income | .27 | .03 | .00 |
Mismatch | –.28 | .04 | .00 |
Strength | .14 | .02 | .00 |
Interest | 1.03 | .03 | .00 |
Ambivalence | .14 | .02 | .00 |
Strength x Mismatch | –.17 | .03 | .00 |
Interest x Mismatch | –.33 | .04 | .00 |
Ambivalence x Mismatch | .32 | .03 | .00 |
Constant | –1.12 | .03 | .00 |
Pseudo-R² | .10 | ||
N | 174,789 |
Notes. 2006 CCES. Entries are probit coefficients and standard errors. Dependent variable is coded “1” for a correct placement of the Senator on the roll-call vote. “Mismatch” is coded “1” for citizens whose own position on the issue conflicts with their party’s. Model includes fixed effects for issue.
Chapter 6
Table A6.1. Timing of Vote Choice, 1980–2004
Variable | B | SE | p |
---|---|---|---|
Age | –.01 | .00 | .04 |
Male | –.06 | .10 | .53 |
White | .64 | .22 | .00 |
Education | .03 | .03 | .30 |
Income | –.03 | .07 | .61 |
Democrat | .38 | .13 | .00 |
Partisan strength | –.92 | .08 | .00 |
Interest | –.83 | .18 | .00 |
Sophistication | .21 | .17 | .21 |
Consistent | –1.34 | .25 | .00 |
Conflicting | 1.41 | .34 | .00 |
Constant | –1.02 | .28 | .00 |
N | 6,132 |
Notes. ANES cumulative file, 1980–2004. Entries are maximum likelihood logit estimates with estimated standard errors.
Table A6.2. Choice Set Size, 1992
Variable | B | SE | p |
---|---|---|---|
Age | .00 | .00 | .05 |
Male | –.01 | .05 | .86 |
White | .16 | .09 | .08 |
Education | –.02 | .02 | .40 |
Income | .04 | .03 | .17 |
Democrat | .03 | .05 | .55 |
Strength | –.12 | .06 | .06 |
Interest | –.07 | .11 | .54 |
Sophistication | –.01 | .12 | .96 |
Consistent | –.19 | .11 | .09 |
Conflicting | .29 | .17 | .08 |
Constant | .50 | .17 | .00 |
N | 1,099 |
Notes. 1992 ANES. Entries are maximum likelihood ordered logit estimates with estimated standard errors.
Table A6.3. Uncertainty in Vote Choice, 1980–2004
Variable | Presidential | House | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
B | SE | p | B | SE | p | |
Panel A. Utility Model | ||||||
Age | .00 | .00 | .30 | .00 | .00 | .44 |
Male | –.01 | .02 | .58 | .02 | .02 | .31 |
White | –.29 | .05 | .00 | –.25 | .05 | .00 |
Education | .01 | .01 | .04 | –.01 | .01 | .27 |
Income | –.02 | .01 | .07 | –.03 | .01 | .01 |
Democrat | .90 | .10 | .00 | .71 | .09 | .00 |
Constant | –.40 | .08 | .00 | .06 | .09 | .52 |
Panel B. Variance Model | ||||||
Strength | –.46 | .07 | .00 | –.57 | .07 | .00 |
Interest | –.28 | .11 | .01 | .06 | .11 | .58 |
Sophistication | –.35 | .10 | .00 | –.18 | .09 | .04 |
Consistent | –1.74 | .12 | .00 | –.69 | .10 | .00 |
Conflicting | 1.95 | .18 | .00 | .63 | .16 | .00 |
N | 5,014 | 6,512 |
Notes. ANES cumulative file, 1980–2004. Entries are maximum likelihood heteroskedastic probit estimates with estimated standard errors. The standard errors for vote choice in presidential elections are clustered by state; those for vote choice in House elections are clustered by district. The election years 1998 and 2002 drop out due to the absence of a measure of partisan ambivalence. Year dummies are not shown.
Table A6.4. Voter Turnout, 1980–2004
Variable | Presidential | House | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
B | SE | p | B | SE | p | |
Age (in decades) | .71 | .13 | .00 | –.29 | .48 | .55 |
Age squared | –.05 | .01 | .00 | .03 | .03 | .28 |
Male | –.33 | .06 | .00 | –.05 | .09 | .61 |
White | –.14 | .11 | .19 | .04 | .04 | .34 |
Education | .26 | .03 | .00 | .04 | .05 | .47 |
Income | .27 | .04 | .00 | .05 | .17 | .75 |
Internal efficacy | .00 | .02 | .95 | .05 | .08 | .52 |
External efficacy | .13 | .03 | .00 | .02 | .05 | .71 |
Contact | .73 | .07 | .00 | .49 | .70 | .48 |
Strength | .64 | .17 | .00 | .05 | .32 | .88 |
Interest | 1.68 | .15 | .00 | .31 | 1.51 | .84 |
Sophistication | 1.21 | .13 | .00 | .75 | 1.05 | .48 |
Consistent | .46 | .19 | .02 | .13 | .08 | .09 |
Conflicting | –.10 | .27 | .70 | –.06 | .23 | .80 |
Constant | –4.59 | .33 | .00 | –.32 | 3.91 | .93 |
N | 6,032 | 1,904 |
Notes. ANES cumulative file, 1980–2004. Table entries are maximum likelihood logit estimates with cluster-corrected standard errors (clustering by year).
Table A6.5. Media Usage, 1980–2004
Variable | B | SE | p |
---|---|---|---|
Age | .01 | .00 | .00 |
Male | .10 | .08 | .23 |
White | –.07 | .10 | .47 |
Education | .13 | .02 | .00 |
Income | .10 | .04 | .01 |
Internal efficacy | .03 | .03 | .35 |
External efficacy | .07 | .03 | .03 |
Contact | .33 | .10 | .00 |
Strength | –.12 | .03 | .00 |
Interest | 2.07 | .18 | .00 |
Sophistication | .69 | .14 | .00 |
Consistent | .46 | .05 | .00 |
Conflicting | .75 | .17 | .00 |
Constant | –3.30 | .22 | .00 |
N | 6,342 |
Notes. ANES cumulative file, 1980–2004. Table entries are maximum likelihood logit estimates with cluster-corrected standard errors (clustering by year).
Table A6.6. Voting Behavior in Presidential Elections, 1984–2004
Variable | B | SE | p |
---|---|---|---|
Age | –.05 | .14 | .73 |
Female | –.03 | .06 | .56 |
Black | –.85 | .10 | .00 |
Education | .18 | .11 | .08 |
Income | .28 | .12 | .02 |
Unemployed | –.07 | .17 | .69 |
Econ. retrospections | .82 | .31 | .01 |
Republican | .54 | .17 | .00 |
Economic preferences | .01 | .42 | .98 |
Social preferences | .50 | .32 | .12 |
Partisan strength | –.39 | .25 | .11 |
Interest | –.71 | .39 | .07 |
Sophistication | –1.65 | .35 | .00 |
Consistent | –.96 | .52 | .07 |
Conflicting | 1.61 | .62 | .01 |
Rep x Strength | 1.19 | .15 | .00 |
Rep x Interest | –.06 | .23 | .78 |
Rep x Sophistication | .58 | .21 | .01 |
Rep x Consistent | 4.78 | .33 | .00 |
Rep x Conflicting | –4.96 | .35 | .00 |
Retros x Strength | .03 | .26 | .90 |
Retros x Interest | .37 | .40 | .37 |
Retros x Sophistication | .31 | .38 | .41 |
Retros x Consistent | –.36 | .57 | .53 |
Retros x Conflicting | –.31 | .63 | .62 |
Econ x Strength | .17 | .38 | .66 |
Econ x Interest | .76 | .57 | .18 |
Econ x Sophistication | 1.46 | .51 | .01 |
Econ x Consistent | –2.91 | .84 | .00 |
Econ x Conflicting | 2.00 | .94 | .03 |
Social x Strength | –.63 | .28 | .03 |
Social x Interest | .40 | .42 | .35 |
Social x Sophistication | .89 | .39 | .02 |
Social x Consistent | –.10 | .62 | .87 |
Social x Conflicting | .34 | .68 | .62 |
Constant | –.65 | .30 | .03 |
Pseudo-R^{2} | .60 | ||
N | 5,289 |
Notes. ANES cumulative file, 1980–2004. Entries are probit coefficients and standard errors. Year dummies are not shown.
Table A6.7. Voting Behavior in the 2008 Presidential Election, 2008
Variable | B | SE | p |
---|---|---|---|
Lagged evaluations | .48 | .03 | .00 |
Age | –.02 | .03 | .55 |
Male | –.01 | .01 | .64 |
Black | –.07 | .02 | .00 |
Education | –.03 | .02 | .13 |
Income | –.05 | .03 | .10 |
Economic retrospections | .08 | .03 | .01 |
Republican | –.04 | .06 | .51 |
Issues | .05 | .15 | .71 |
Partisan strength | .00 | .03 | .94 |
Interest | –.09 | .06 | .16 |
Sophistication | –.19 | .06 | .00 |
Consistent | –.13 | .07 | .05 |
Conflicting | .08 | .09 | .36 |
Rep x Strength | .14 | .04 | .00 |
Rep x Interest | .12 | .06 | .03 |
Rep x Sophistication | –.01 | .06 | .93 |
Rep x Consistent | .32 | .06 | .00 |
Rep x Conflicting | –.29 | .08 | .00 |
Issues x Strength | –.12 | .09 | .17 |
Issues x Interest | .04 | .14 | .77 |
Issues x Sophistication | .27 | .14 | .06 |
Issues x Consistent | –.09 | .15 | .56 |
Issues x Conflicting | .19 | .20 | .32 |
Constant | .35 | .07 | .00 |
R^{2} | .73 | ||
N | 985 |
Notes. 2008 ANES Panel. Entries are OLS coefficients and standard errors. All variables scaled from 0 to 1.
Table A6.8. Voting Behavior in US House Elections, 1984–2004
Variable | B | SE | p |
---|---|---|---|
Age | .00 | .11 | 1.00 |
Female | .06 | .04 | .14 |
Black | –.39 | .09 | .00 |
Education | .15 | .08 | .05 |
Income | .16 | .09 | .08 |
Unemployed | .18 | .14 | .18 |
Economic retrospections | .46 | .25 | .07 |
Republican incumbent | 1.07 | .21 | .00 |
Democratic incumbent | –.73 | .20 | .00 |
Republican | .58 | .14 | .00 |
Economic preferences | .56 | .35 | .11 |
Social preferences | .11 | .25 | .65 |
Partisan strength | –.82 | .21 | .00 |
Interest | –.01 | .35 | .98 |
Sophistication | .31 | .32 | .33 |
Consistent | –.33 | .36 | .36 |
Conflicting | –.53 | .49 | .28 |
Rep. Inc. × Strength | .12 | .17 | .47 |
Rep. Inc. x Interest | –.06 | .27 | .83 |
Rep. Inc. x Sophistication | –.52 | .25 | .04 |
Rep. Inc. x Consistent | .12 | .28 | .66 |
Rep. Inc. x Conflicting | –.37 | .37 | .31 |
Dem. Inc. x Strength | .04 | .16 | .80 |
Dem. Inc. x Interest | –.06 | .26 | .82 |
Dem. Inc. x Sophistication | –.29 | .24 | .23 |
Dem. Inc. x Consistent | .29 | .27 | .29 |
Dem. Inc. x Conflicting | –.21 | .36 | .55 |
Retros x Strength | .14 | .19 | .44 |
Retros x Interest | .32 | .30 | .29 |
Retros x Sophistication | –.40 | .29 | .16 |
Retros x Consistent | –.87 | .33 | .01 |
Retros x Conflicting | .63 | .43 | .14 |
Rep. x Strength | .96 | .12 | .00 |
Rep x Interest | .00 | .18 | 1.00 |
Rep x Sophistication | .04 | .17 | .80 |
Rep x Consistent | 1.80 | .21 | .00 |
Rep x Conflicting | –1.72 | .25 | .00 |
Econ x Strength | .53 | .29 | .06 |
Econ x Interest | –.21 | .45 | .64 |
Econ x Sophistication | .19 | .41 | .64 |
Econ x Consistent | –.88 | .49 | .07 |
Econ x Conflicting | 2.04 | .65 | .00 |
Social x Strength | –.07 | .20 | .72 |
Social x Interest | .01 | .31 | .97 |
Social x Sophistication | .38 | .29 | .19 |
Social x Consistent | .05 | .34 | .89 |
Social x Conflicting | .66 | .45 | .14 |
Constant | –1.07 | .29 | .00 |
Pseudo-R^{2} | .46 | ||
N | 7,003 |
Notes. ANES cumulative file, 1980–2004. Entries are probit coefficients and standard errors. Year dummies are not shown.
Table A6.9. Defection Among Unsorted Partisans, 1980–2004
Variable | Unsorted Economic | Unsorted Social | Unsorted on Both | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
B | SE | p | B | SE | p | B | SE | p | |
1988 | .30 | .22 | .17 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
1992 | .80 | .28 | .00 | –.16 | .18 | .38 | .24 | .49 | .62 |
1996 | .21 | .28 | .46 | –.26 | .20 | .19 | –.05 | .48 | .91 |
2000 | .58 | .28 | .03 | –.12 | .17 | .49 | –.08 | .55 | .89 |
2004 | –.39 | .23 | .09 | –.52 | .16 | .00 | –1.04 | .40 | .01 |
Age | –.33 | .35 | .34 | .05 | .29 | .87 | .43 | .83 | .60 |
Female | .00 | .14 | .98 | –.09 | .12 | .43 | –.14 | .29 | .62 |
Black | .22 | .26 | .38 | .14 | .22 | .51 | .27 | .50 | .59 |
Education | .62 | .26 | .02 | .15 | .22 | .50 | .93 | .56 | .10 |
Income | –.37 | .29 | .20 | –.09 | .24 | .73 | .78 | .61 | .20 |
Strength | .64 | .19 | .00 | 1.08 | .16 | .00 | 1.26 | .47 | .01 |
Interest | .00 | .28 | .99 | –.08 | .24 | .75 | .38 | .65 | .56 |
Sophistication | –.13 | .25 | .61 | .07 | .23 | .76 | –.98 | .60 | .10 |
Consistent | 3.13 | .43 | .00 | 2.87 | .34 | .00 | 2.01 | .95 | .04 |
Conflicting | –2.84 | .39 | .00 | –2.78 | .32 | .00 | –2.07 | .68 | .00 |
Constant | –.14 | .34 | .69 | .17 | .26 | .52 | –.67 | .67 | .32 |
Pseudo-R^{2} | .33 | .32 | .41 | ||||||
N | 561 | 831 | 137 |
Notes. ANES cumulative file, 1980–2004. Entries are probit coefficients and standard errors. Dependent variable is coded “1” if respondent voted for the in-party, and zero if he or she voted for the out-party. Economically unsorted respondents were unsorted on two of the three issues examined, while socially unsorted respondents were unsorted on both of two issues examined.
Table A6.10. Partisan Ambivalence, Defection, Split-Ticket, and Third-Party Voting
Variable | Defect Pres. | Defect House | Split-Ticket | Third-Party | ||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
B | SE | p | B | SE | p | B | SE | p | B | SE | p | |
Age | .00 | .00 | .75 | .00 | .00 | .08 | .00 | .00 | .25 | –.03 | .01 | .00 |
Male | –.09 | .10 | .36 | –.06 | .08 | .42 | –.06 | .09 | .47 | .41 | .16 | .01 |
White | 1.00 | .18 | .00 | .83 | .17 | .00 | .66 | .22 | .00 | 2.05 | .53 | .00 |
Education | –.05 | .04 | .17 | –.01 | .02 | .63 | .01 | .03 | .82 | –.09 | .06 | .12 |
Income | .01 | .05 | .91 | .00 | .03 | .89 | .04 | .05 | .37 | .13 | .09 | .13 |
Democrat | 1.09 | .10 | .00 | –.09 | .18 | .60 | –.05 | .13 | .70 | .18 | .16 | .27 |
Out-party familiarity | — | — | — | — | — | — | 1.17 | .13 | .00 | — | — | — |
Major candidate dislike | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 2.30 | .29 | .00 |
Strength | –.89 | .13 | .00 | –.78 | .08 | .00 | –.65 | .11 | .00 | –1.15 | .22 | .00 |
Interest | –.43 | .20 | .03 | .07 | .11 | .54 | –.04 | .18 | .81 | –.35 | .34 | .31 |
Sophistication | –.44 | .19 | .02 | –.21 | .13 | .12 | –.45 | .18 | .01 | –.10 | .35 | .79 |
Consistent | –4.73 | .32 | .00 | –1.39 | .21 | .00 | –1.10 | .20 | .00 | –1.38 | .42 | .00 |
Conflicting | 4.53 | .10 | .00 | 1.40 | .28 | .00 | 1.04 | .27 | .00 | 1.50 | .56 | .01 |
Constant | –1.35 | .32 | .00 | –.85 | .30 | .00 | –1.57 | .35 | .00 | -2.62 | .68 | .00 |
N | 5,014 | 6,512 | 4,285 | 1921 |
Notes. Table entries for defection in presidential elections are maximum likelihood logit estimates with estimated standard errors. Table entries for defection in House elections are maximum likelihood hierarchical logit estimates with their estimated standard errors. The hierarchical model contains a random intercept across states and congressional districts (estimated variance component is .025, ns).
Table A6.11. Effects of Anxiety and Enthusiasm on Vote Intention, 1980–2004
Variable | B(SE) |
---|---|
Party ID | 1.06 (.14)* |
Issues | 2.09 (.40)* |
In-anxiety | .60 (.32)^ |
Out-anxiety | .28 (.25) |
In-enthus | –.56 (.28)* |
Out-enthus | –1.05 (.31)* |
PID x In-Anx | –.65 (.19)* |
PID x Out-Anx | .52 (.19)* |
PID x In-Enthus | 1.89 (.20)* |
PID x Out-Enthus | –1.79 (.20)* |
Issues x In-Anx | –.56 (.62) |
Issues x Out-Anx | –.96 (.54)^ |
Issues x In-Enthus | –1.05 (.59)^ |
Issues x Out-Enthus | 3.80 (.62)* |
Candidate evaluations | 7.23 (.21)* |
Age | .02 (.01) |
Gender | .02 (.04) |
Black | –.32 (.07)* |
Hispanic | –.02 (.02) |
Education | .19 (.08)* |
Income | –.05 (.08) |
Interest | –.04 (.07) |
Cut 1 | –4.77 (.24)* |
Cut 2 | .51 (.02)* |
N | 8,512 |
Notes. ANES cumulative file, 1980–2004. Entries are ordered probit coefficients and standard errors.
*p 〈 .05; ^p 〈 .10.
Table A6.12. Effects of Anxiety and Enthusiasm on Candidate Evaluations, 2008
Variable | B(SE) |
---|---|
Lagged evaluation | .38 (.04)* |
Age | –.04 (.02) |
Male | –.02 (.01)^ |
Black | .00 (.02) |
Education | –.06 (.02)* |
Income | –.06 (.03)* |
Republican | .29 (.04)* |
Issue preferences | .19 (.08)* |
In-anxiety | .04 (.08) |
Out-anxiety | –.09 (.04)* |
In-enthusiasm | –.11 (.04)* |
Out-enthusiasm | .11 (.06)^ |
Rep x In-Anx | –.05 (.10) |
Rep x Out-Anx | .05 (.06) |
Rep x In-Enth | .23 (.06)* |
Rep x Out-Enth | –.44 (.08)* |
Issues x In-Anx | –.03 (.16) |
Issues x Out-Anx | .16 (.10)^ |
Issues x In-Enth | –.09 (.11) |
Issues x Out-Enth | .27 (.16)^ |
Constant | .19 (.04)* |
R^{2} | .71 |
N | 1,079 |
Notes. ANES 2008 Panel. Entries are OLS coefficients and standard errors.
*p 〈 .05; ^p 〈 .10.
(p.247) Chapter 7
Table A7.1. Partisan Change, 1992–1994
Variable | Unsorted Respondents | Sorted Respondent | ||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Health Insurance | Moral Traditionalism | Health Insurance | Moral Traditionalism | |||||||||
B | SE | p | B | SE | p | B | SE | p | B | SE | p | |
Age | 1.60 | .99 | .11 | –.17 | .70 | .81 | –.27 | .49 | .59 | .38 | .63 | .54 |
Male | .17 | .50 | .74 | –.03 | .32 | .93 | .06 | .25 | .82 | .09 | .31 | .79 |
Black | .68 | .92 | .46 | .35 | .53 | .51 | –.35 | .42 | .40 | –.11 | .55 | .85 |
Education | –1.24 | .83 | .13 | –.28 | .67 | .68 | –.31 | .52 | .56 | –.38 | .58 | .51 |
Income | 2.32 | 1.02 | .02 | .24 | .66 | .71 | –.06 | .49 | .90 | .52 | .59 | .38 |
Strength | –.63 | .70 | .37 | –1.19 | .47 | .01 | –1.33 | .31 | .00 | –1.53 | .47 | .00 |
Interest | .28 | .74 | .71 | –.74 | .51 | .14 | –.45 | .39 | .25 | –.37 | .50 | .46 |
Sophistication | –.86 | 1.00 | .39 | –.98 | .76 | .20 | –.28 | .54 | .61 | –.23 | .70 | .74 |
Consistent | –1.81 | 1.14 | .11 | –.79 | .74 | .29 | –.76 | .50 | .13 | –1.20 | .68 | .08 |
Conflicting | 3.38 | 1.26 | .01 | 1.37 | .98 | .16 | .51 | .75 | .50 | .88 | .88 | .32 |
Constant | –2.02 | .99 | .04 | .55 | .55 | .32 | .24 | .39 | .53 | –.57 | .50 | .26 |
Pseudo-R^{2} | .28 | .15 | .17 | .18 | ||||||||
N | 85 | 145 | 314 | 278 |
Notes. ANES 1992–1994 Panel. Entries are probit coefficients and standard errors. Dependent variable is coded “1” for citizens who changed partisan identity, and “0” for those who remained stable from 1992 to 1994.
Chapter 8
Table A8.1. Effects of Partisanship and GDP Growth on Retrospections Across Level of Partisan Strength
Variable | Leaning | Weak | Strong | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
B | SE | p | B | SE | p | B | SE | p | |
Age | –.02 | .02 | .35 | –.03 | .02 | .04 | –.02 | .02 | .27 |
Female | –.03 | .01 | .00 | –.05 | .01 | .00 | –.05 | .01 | .00 |
Black | –.05 | .01 | .00 | –.04 | .01 | .00 | –.05 | .01 | .00 |
Education | .04 | .02 | .01 | .05 | .01 | .00 | .06 | .01 | .00 |
Income | .02 | .02 | .19 | .01 | .01 | .59 | .02 | .01 | .17 |
Unemployed | –.04 | .02 | .03 | –.06 | .02 | .00 | –.04 | .02 | .03 |
In-party | .01 | .02 | .59 | .03 | .02 | .08 | .03 | .02 | .11 |
GDP growth | .02 | .01 | .19 | .03 | .01 | .00 | .03 | .01 | .01 |
Interest | –.11 | .03 | .00 | –.04 | .02 | .15 | –.05 | .03 | .09 |
Sophistication | –.04 | .03 | .24 | –.03 | .02 | .24 | –.05 | .03 | .06 |
Consistent | –.17 | .04 | .00 | –.10 | .03 | .00 | –.10 | .03 | .00 |
Conflicting | .19 | .05 | .00 | .10 | .04 | .02 | –.10 | .05 | .06 |
In-Party x Int. | .07 | .03 | .02 | .06 | .03 | .03 | .12 | .03 | .00 |
In-Party x Soph | –.02 | .03 | .61 | .03 | .02 | .25 | .04 | .03 | .12 |
In-Party x Conf. | –.34 | .05 | .00 | –.23 | .04 | .00 | –.21 | .05 | .00 |
In-Party x Cons. | .26 | .04 | .00 | .18 | .03 | .00 | .20 | .03 | .00 |
GDP x Int. | .02 | .01 | .01 | .00 | .01 | .48 | .00 | .01 | .75 |
GDP x Soph | .02 | .01 | .00 | .01 | .00 | .05 | .01 | .01 | .17 |
GDP x Conf. | –.01 | .01 | .35 | .01 | .01 | .46 | .05 | .01 | .00 |
GDP x Cons. | .01 | .01 | .14 | .01 | .01 | .27 | .00 | .01 | .98 |
Constant | .34 | .05 | .00 | .30 | .05 | .00 | .30 | .05 | .00 |
SD (constant) | .10 | .02 | .09 | .02 | .10 | .02 | |||
SD (residual) | .23 | .00 | .22 | .00 | .23 | .00 | |||
N | 3,498 | 4,719 | 4,332 | ||||||
Years | 11 | 11 | 11 |
Notes. Entries are restricted maximum likelihood coefficients and standard errors. Model includes random intercepts for year. Dependent variable is economic retrospections, where higher values indicate more positive assessments. GDP, gross domestic product.
Table A8.2. Voting Behavior Dynamics Across Partisan Strength
Variable | Weak | Strong | |||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
B | SE | p | B | SE | p | B | SE | p | |
Age | .13 | .24 | .59 | .04 | .22 | .87 | –.27 | .30 | .38 |
Female | –.15 | .10 | .12 | .07 | .09 | .45 | –.17 | .12 | .18 |
Black | –1.07 | .19 | .00 | –.89 | .17 | .00 | –.59 | .20 | .00 |
Education | .17 | .18 | .36 | .19 | .17 | .26 | .21 | .23 | .37 |
Income | –.11 | .20 | .59 | .57 | .18 | .00 | .15 | .26 | .55 |
Unemployed | –.32 | .29 | .26 | .09 | .27 | .76 | –.13 | .34 | .70 |
Retrospections | .25 | .54 | .65 | 1.09 | .44 | .01 | .85 | .68 | .21 |
Republican | .64 | .28 | .02 | 1.24 | .23 | .00 | 2.03 | .42 | .00 |
Economic issues | –.80 | .73 | .28 | .48 | .56 | .39 | .24 | .94 | .80 |
Social issues | .87 | .59 | .14 | –.02 | .43 | .96 | .30 | .67 | .66 |
Interest | –.66 | .70 | .35 | –.86 | .62 | .17 | –.41 | .84 | .63 |
Sophistication | –2.35 | .61 | .00 | –1.19 | .56 | .03 | –1.25 | .72 | .08 |
Consistent | –2.98 | 1.10 | .01 | –.62 | .83 | .45 | –.69 | .96 | .47 |
Conflicting | 4.31 | 1.08 | .00 | 2.08 | 1.04 | .05 | –3.22 | 1.70 | .06 |
Rep x Interest | –.45 | .41 | .26 | .28 | .36 | .43 | –.76 | .55 | .17 |
Rep x Soph. | 1.01 | .36 | .01 | –.20 | .33 | .55 | 1.56 | .48 | .00 |
Rep x Cons. | 5.99 | .59 | .00 | 4.93 | .54 | .00 | 3.14 | .68 | .00 |
Rep x Conf. | –6.47 | .60 | .00 | –4.61 | .57 | .00 | –3.31 | .94 | .00 |
Retros x Int. | .78 | .75 | .30 | .55 | .65 | .39 | .79 | .87 | .36 |
Retros x Soph | 1.13 | .70 | .11 | –.35 | .62 | .57 | –.46 | .76 | .55 |
Retros x Consis. | –.30 | 1.08 | .78 | .48 | .94 | .61 | –.55 | 1.08 | .61 |
Retros x Conf. | –2.55 | 1.13 | .03 | –.17 | 1.06 | .87 | 1.03 | 1.49 | .49 |
Econ x Int. | 1.26 | 1.06 | .24 | .47 | .91 | .60 | .66 | 1.24 | .60 |
Econ x Soph. | 2.06 | .98 | .04 | 1.62 | .82 | .05 | .32 | 1.01 | .75 |
Econ x Cons. | –1.11 | 1.68 | .51 | –3.68 | 1.34 | .01 | –1.61 | 1.58 | .31 |
Econ x Conf. | .94 | 1.60 | .56 | .03 | 1.56 | .98 | 7.85 | 2.52 | .00 |
Social x Int. | .24 | .82 | .77 | .71 | .69 | .30 | –.44 | .88 | .62 |
Social x Soph. | .19 | .74 | .80 | 1.17 | .63 | .06 | 1.53 | .80 | .06 |
Social x Cons. | 1.38 | 1.22 | .26 | –1.12 | 1.02 | .27 | –1.00 | 1.13 | .38 |
Social x Conf. | –.35 | 1.17 | .76 | .23 | 1.13 | .84 | 2.87 | 1.72 | .10 |
Constant | –.20 | .50 | .70 | –1.23 | .44 | .01 | –1.31 | .70 | .06 |
Pseudo-R^{2} | .49 | .49 | .81 | ||||||
N | 1,381 | 1,783 | 2,125 |
Notes. Entries are restricted maximum likelihood coefficients and standard errors. Model includes random intercepts for year. Dependent variable is economic retrospections, where higher values indicate more positive assessments.