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Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism$
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Derk Pereboom

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199764037

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764037.001.0001

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Mental Compositional Properties

Mental Compositional Properties

Chapter:
(p.148) 8 Mental Compositional Properties
Source:
Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism
Author(s):

Derk Pereboom (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764037.003.0008

Chapter 8 develops a model of the mental that is not functional in the external-relations sense; that is, one in which the essences of types of mental properties do not consist in their causal relations to sensory inputs, behavioral outputs, and other mental states. Instead mental properties — and this includes phenomenal properties — are identical to broadly physical compositional properties, properties things have solely by virtue of intrinsic features of their parts, either proper or improper, and relations these parts have to one another. This model would secure the causal efficacy of the mental qua mental in a way that the most common sort of functionalism cannot. It preserves nonreductivism, since multiple realizability arguments indicate that mental compositional properties would not be essentially neural or microphysical. At the same time, given the identities that it affirms, in a significant respect the position espoused amounts to a compromise with the type-type reductionist views. I close by considering several objections that have been raised against nonreductive views generally, arguing that in each case the model yields an adequate response.

Keywords:   nonreductive physicalism, reductionism, functionalism, compositional property, constitution, projectible, causal power, token identity, type identity, Jaegwon Kim

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