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Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism$

Derk Pereboom

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199764037

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764037.001.0001

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(p.173) Bibliography

(p.173) Bibliography

Source:
Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism
Publisher:
Oxford University Press

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