Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Rethinking the GoodMoral Ideals and the Nature of Practical Reasoning$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Larry S. Temkin

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199759446

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199759446.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 11 December 2018

Exploring Transitivity

Exploring Transitivity

Part II

Chapter:
(p.194) 7 Exploring Transitivity
Source:
Rethinking the Good
Author(s):

Larry S. Temkin

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199759446.003.0007

This chapter continues the exploration of transitivity. Chapter 6 showed that one important normative relation, “the not worse than” relation, may be nontransitive. It also developed and explored a model for understanding why that relation, and others, would be nontransitive. The chapter begins by discussing two other important normative relations that may be nontransitive, the “permissibility” relation and the “obligatoriness” relation. It then suggests that there is good reason to believe that if the “obligatoriness” relation is nontransitive, the “all-things-considered better than” relation will also be nontransitive. It next considers an important response to the claim that the “obligatoriness” relation is nontransitive. It directly takes up the question of whether the “all-things-considered better than” relation (in this book's wide reason-implying sense) could be nontransitive. It spells out the conditions under which the relation would or would not be transitive and reexamines some of the arguments of earlier chapters in this light. Finally, it notes some of the important theoretical commitments that accompany both the view that the “all-things-considered better than” relation (in the aforementioned wide reason-implying sense) is transitive and the contrary view that it may not be, pointing out that the former view will hold if a position called the Internal Aspects View is correct, while the latter view will hold if a position called the Essentially Comparative View is correct.

Keywords:   nontransitive relations, permissibility relation, obligatoriness relation, all-things-considered better than, the Internal Aspects View, Essentially Comparative View

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .