The chapter reviews the similarities, both methodological and substantive, between the heuristics and biases and the fast and frugal heuristics school. But it emphasizes to a greater extent distinctions between the schools, both in how proponents model cognition generally, and the implications of these distinct models for thinking about the general quality of human judgment, the need for expertise in making collective decisions, the utility of cost-benefit analysis, the propriety of paternalism, how best to solve information problems in markets, the desirability of using rules rather than standards, and the nature of discrimination. It argues that the better known aspect of the debate—about how well people reason—might be profitably advanced if not resolved if each side acknowledged the contributions of its opponents, but that the F&F insistence on both the prevalence and superiority of lexical decision making is both unconvincing and impossible to incorporate into existing understandings of law and policy.
Keywords: heuristics, biases, fast and frugal heuristics, judgment and decision making, fallibility of judgment, lexical decision making, information disclosure, cost-benefit analysis, paternalism, Kahneman and Tversky, Gigerenzer
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