This study analyzes how the United States Army, particularly the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), attempted to measure its progress and effectiveness while conducting counterinsurgency operations during the Vietnam War. In short, in a war without front lines, how did the army know if it was winning or losing? White House advisers, Pentagon officials, MACV staff officers, and army field commanders all faced immense challenges in identifying useful metrics for gauging success in an unconventional environment. Throughout the war, they often came to contradictory conclusions. Political ... More

This study analyzes how the United States Army, particularly the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), attempted to measure its progress and effectiveness while conducting counterinsurgency operations during the Vietnam War. In short, in a war without front lines, how did the army know if it was winning or losing? White House advisers, Pentagon officials, MACV staff officers, and army field commanders all faced immense challenges in identifying useful metrics for gauging success in an unconventional environment. Throughout the war, they often came to contradictory conclusions. Political, economic, and cultural factors influenced daily the course and conduct of the army’s counterinsurgency operations. In such a complex environment, how did American officers and soldiers know whether or not they were making progress over the course of a decade-long war?