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Reasons as Defaults$
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John F. Horty

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199744077

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744077.001.0001

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Problems with priorities

Problems with priorities

(p.192) Chapter 8 Problems with priorities
Reasons as Defaults

John F. Horty

Oxford University Press

This chapter addresses some of the problems confronting the simple account of defeat presented earlier, by exploring two further accounts of default reasoning with fixed priorities. The first fits within the general framework developed in this book, simply refining the earlier concept of defeat. The second shifts to an entirely different, more procedural framework, in which priorities among defaults are accommodated by controlling the order in which these defaults are applied.

Keywords:   default reasoning, defeat, rebutting defeat, order of application, reinstatement

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