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Reasons as Defaults$
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John F. Horty

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199744077

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744077.001.0001

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Reasons and oughts

Reasons and oughts

(p.65) Chapter 3 Reasons and oughts
Reasons as Defaults

John F. Horty

Oxford University Press

The goal of this chapter is to explain how the various reasons at work in a situation can support conclusions about what an agent ought to do—in the language of Ross, how prima facie duties, or prima facie oughts, can lead to all things considered oughts. This chapter describes a systematic procedure, applicable in the broad range of ordinary cases, through which ought statements can be derived from default theories and the reasons they provide. Indeed, the chapter presents two such procedures—two deontic logics—one that allows for the possibility of conflicting all things considered oughts and one that does not.

Keywords:   reasons, ought statements, oughts, deontic logic

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