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Reasons as Defaults$
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John F. Horty

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199744077

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744077.001.0001

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From defaults to reasons

From defaults to reasons

(p.41) Chapter 2 From defaults to reasons
Reasons as Defaults

John F. Horty

Oxford University Press

The goal of this chapter is to show how default logic can be adapted to serve as a foundation for a concrete theory of reasons. The previous chapter talked loosely of a correspondence between default rules and reasons. Having introduced a number of technical concepts in the course of developing our simple default logic, this chapter considers this correspondence in more detail, as well as the overall account of reasons that emerges from the underlying default logic.

Keywords:   defaults, reasons, austere theory of reasons, conflict, strength, defeat, rebutting defeat, enablers

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