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Reasons as Defaults
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Reasons as Defaults

John F. Horty

Abstract

Although the study of reasons plays an important role in both epistemology and moral philosophy, little attention has been devoted to the question of how, exactly, reason interact to support the actions or conclusions they do. The goal of this book is to answer this question by providing a precise, concrete account of reasons and their interaction, based on the logic of default reasoning. The book begins with an intuitive, accessible introduction to default logic itself, and then argues that this logic can be adapted to serve as a foundation for a concrete theory of reasons. It then shows that ... More

Keywords: reasons, default logic, defaults, deontic logic, oughts, moral conflicts, defeat, undercutting defeat, exclusionary reasons, particularism, floating conclusions

Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 2012 Print ISBN-13: 9780199744077
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2012 DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744077.001.0001

Authors

Affiliations are at time of print publication.

John F. Horty, author
University of Maryland

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