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Access PointsAn Institutional Theory of Policy Bias and Policy Complexity$
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Sean D. Ehrlich

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199737536

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199737536.001.0001

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How Much Environmental Regulation Will a Country Have?

How Much Environmental Regulation Will a Country Have?

Chapter:
(p.93) Chapter 4 How Much Environmental Regulation Will a Country Have?
Source:
Access Points
Author(s):

Sean D. Ehrlich

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199737536.003.0004

Existing research has extensively examined whether democratic or dictatorial regimes are better for the environment, but little research has investigated how democracies might differ among themselves. This chapter argues that more access points in democracies should lead to fewer environmental regulations since regulated industries should enjoy a collective action advantage given that the costs of regulations are concentrated on these industries while the benefits are broadly dispersed, sometimes to everyone on the planet. This chapter tests this argument by examining how many environmental treaties a country becomes a party to as well as the level of environmental taxation in a country.

Keywords:   environmental regulation, collective action problem, treaties, taxation, bias

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