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Access Points
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Access Points: An Institutional Theory of Policy Bias and Policy Complexity

Sean D. Ehrlich

Abstract

Access Points develops a new theory about how democratic institutions influence policy outcomes. Access Point Theory argues that the more points of access that institutions provide to interest groups, the cheaper lobbying will be, and, thus, the more lobbying will occur. This will lead to more complex policy, as policymakers insert specific provisions to benefit special interests, and, if one side of the debate has a lobbying advantage, to more biased policy, as the advantaged side is able to better take advantage of the cheaper lobbying. This book then uses Access Point Theory to ... More

Keywords: access points, democratic institutions, interest groups, political economy, economy policy, trade, banking regulations, environmental regulations, taxation

Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 2011 Print ISBN-13: 9780199737536
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2012 DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199737536.001.0001

Authors

Affiliations are at time of print publication.

Sean D. Ehrlich, author
Florida State University

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