Frege’s Theory of Sense and Reference: Some Exegetical Notes1
This chapter analyzes Frege's theory of sense and reference. There is in a sense a “backward road” from references to senses. For everyone who specifies a reference must do so in some way. Then, by her awareness of how she has specified the reference, she is aware of the way the reference is fixed, and hence is aware of the sense. Frege's most explicit use of this is in the beginning of the Grundgesetze (1893), where, after concluding that every term has a unique referent, and every sentence a truth-value, he concludes that every sentence of the system expresses a thought given by the way the truth-conditions are specified. Linguistic rules, and the Fregean thoughts involved, can normally be given by general directions exemplified by (α) and (β). But to apply these rules, and indeed to understand them, a user of the language or a thinker must have something very like Russellian acquaintance with directly or indirectly quoted material, senses, times, subjects, and inner mental states.
Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.