Metaphysical deflationism ‐ one way of construing inchoate antimetaphysical sentiment ‐ claims that various metaphysical questions are nonsubstantive, in the sense of having different answers relative to different equally joint‐carving candidate meanings for their crucial terms. The answer to such questions is simply a matter of which of various equally good ways to talk is *our* way to talk. Against metaphysical deflationists, a metaphysician can argue that one of the ways of talking corresponds to reality’s structure. (This distinguished way of talking may differ from natural language, and so the metaphysician may need to “enter the metaphysics room”, and stipulate a new language in which to conduct her disputes.) Whether the metaphysician or the deflationist is right is a squarely metaphysical, rather than “methodological” matter; it is a matter of how much structure reality contains.
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