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The Laws of BeliefRanking Theory and Its Philosophical Applications$

Wolfgang Spohn

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199697502

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199697502.001.0001

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(p.556) Bibliography

(p.556) Bibliography

The Laws of Belief
Oxford University Press

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