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Destiny and DeliberationEssays in Philosophical Theology$

Jonathan L. Kvanvig

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199696574

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199696574.001.0001

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(p.178) Bibliography

(p.178) Bibliography

Destiny and Deliberation
Oxford University Press

Bibliography references:

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