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Varieties of Logic$

Stewart Shapiro

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780199696529

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199696529.001.0001

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(p.210) References

(p.210) References

Source:
Varieties of Logic
Publisher:
Oxford University Press

Bibliography references:

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