Ways of Thinking
The account of de se thought in the book appeals centrally to ways of thinking of things. But many find appeal to ways of thinking of things of any kind objectionable. This chapter begins by explaining and responding to the overarching worries with Fregean accounts of propositions that appeal to an ontology of ways of thinking. Such an ontology is shown to be compatible with a number of different views about how mental states are realized in the mind. The recognition that propositions contain ways of thinking is also precisely the missing ingredient that allows one to account for the remaining unresolved problems involving the context-sensitivity of sentences containing embedded questions, involving knowledge who. Finally, the version of the Fregean view of propositions that is defended reveals the error in the thought that propositional knowledge is behaviorally inert.
Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.