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Know How$
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Jason Stanley

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199695362

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695362.001.0001

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Ryle on Knowing How

Ryle on Knowing How

Chapter:
(p.1) 1 Ryle on Knowing How
Source:
Know How
Author(s):

Jason Stanley

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695362.003.0001

Gilbert Ryle is well known for arguing that knowing how is not a kind of knowing that. The purpose of this chapter is to distinguish Ryle’s correct insights about action from his incorrect conclusions about the relation between knowing how to do something and knowing that something is the case. Ryle provides several different regress arguments to show that knowing how is not a kind of knowing that. Various versions of Ryle’s regress arguments are discussed, including his version of the Lewis Carroll argument. The morals of the discussion are applied a number of recent discussions in ethics and the philosophy of mind about what it is to act intelligently and what it is to act for a reason.

Keywords:   Gilbert Ryle, skill, Hubert Dreyfus, acting on a reason, regress, Lewis Carroll

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