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Shaping the Normative Landscape$
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David Owens

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199691500

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199691500.001.0001

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Wronging

Wronging

Chapter:
(p.44) 2 Wronging
Source:
Shaping the Normative Landscape
Author(s):

David Owens

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199691500.003.0003

There is a difference between committing a wrong and doing something that wrongs someone, that violates some right of theirs. Why does it matter whether something counts as a wronging rather than simply a wrong? Because where the wrong counts as a wronging, the wronged party has the power to forgive the wrong. It is good for us to be able to forgive; forgiveness serves a normative interest, namely our remissive interest. What makes it the case that something wrongs you? According to the Injury Hypothesis, people are wronged just where their interests are adversely affected by the wrong. But there are bare wrongs, wrongs that involve no action against an interest of the wronged party. To account for bare wronging we must acknowledge normative and well as non-normative interests. We need to consider people's interest in being able to control what counts as a wrong to them.

Keywords:   injury hypothesis, rights, wrong, wronging, forgiveness, bare wrong, remissive interest

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