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Surpassing the Sovereign StateThe Wealth, Self-Rule, and Security Advantages of Partially Independent Territories$

David A. Rezvani

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780199688494

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199688494.001.0001

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(p.312) (p.313) (p.314) (p.315) Appendix 2 Negotiations Proposing Regional Autonomy

(p.312) (p.313) (p.314) (p.315) Appendix 2 Negotiations Proposing Regional Autonomy

Surpassing the Sovereign State
Oxford University Press

Core state/ territory

Negotiation details

  • Patani Region

  • (Thailand)

Historic proposals from 1950 to the present by Patani leaders in three southern provinces of southern Thailand (Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat) for autonomy.

  • Karen Region

  • (Burma)

Historic proposals from 1949 up to the present by Karen leaders in Burma for autonomous powers.

  • Eastern Libya

  • (Libya)

2012 proposals by leaders in eastern Libya for autonomous powers within a united Libya.

  • Darfur

  • (Sudan)

2004 UN High Commissioner for Refugees proposals for a federal arrangement to be applied to the Darfur region in Sudan.*

  • Tibet

  • (China)

2003 talks between Chinese and Tibetan leaders after the rejection of independence by Tibet’s leader, the Dalai Lama, in favor of “genuine autonomy”.**

  • Palestinian Territories

  • (Israel)

The 2003 Geneva Accords (between former Israeli and Palestinian officials) and the 2000 Clinton Plan (proposed by US President Bill Clinton after the collapse of the 2000 Camp David II Summit) for a so-called “Palestinian state,” which similar to the partially independent arrangements such as the Marshall or Palau Islands, would divide significant military, foreign relations, and territorial powers with another state.

Western Sahara (Morocco)

2002 UN negotiations for the semi-autonomous status of Western Sahara within Morocco.

  • Irian Jaya

  • (Indonesia)

2002 negotiations for Irian Jaya’s semi-independent status within Indonesia.

  • Kashmir

  • (India)

1993–2001 Indian–Kashmiri and backchannel Indian–Pakistani negotiations for a constitutionally entrenched partially independent arrangement, referred to as “autonomy plus.”

  • Kosovo

  • (Yugoslavia)

1999 Rambouillet self-rule proposals for Kosovo within Yugoslavia.

  • Cordillera

  • (Philippines)

In 1998 and 1990 Cordillera’s population rejected by plebiscite two plans for PITs in the Philippines.

  • Northern Cyprus

  • (Cyprus)

Greek Cypriot proposals (rejected by the Turkish Cypriots) for PIT-like regimes for Northern Cyprus.

  • Oaxaca/

  • Chiapas

  • (Mexico)

1996 Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) peace negotiations with the Mexican federal government, the success of which the EZLN conditioned on the central state’s ability to constitutionally grant powers of internal self-determination to their people.††

  • Nagorno-Karabakh

  • (Azerbaijan)

1995 Hague negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan regarding Nagorno-Karabakh.

  • Quebec

  • (Canada)

The unimplemented 1994 Meech Lake Accords for a “special society” status for Quebec within Canada.

  • North/East

  • Sri Lanka

  • (Sri Lanka)

1995 proposals and the 1957 Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam Pact proposing federal arrangements for the Tamils in North and Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka.

  • Taiwan

  • (China)

Chinese proposals after 1979 (during and after the leadership of Deng Xiaoping) that would guarantee Taiwan final decision-making powers under the formula of “one country, two systems.”

(*) BBC News World Edition 2004.

() I thank Robert Rotberg for his observations on this issue.