Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Kant and Rational Psychology$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Corey W. Dyck

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780199688296

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199688296.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 15 December 2018

Cartesian Questions

Cartesian Questions

Idealism and the Illusion of the Soul

(p.173) 6 Cartesian Questions
Kant and Rational Psychology

Corey W. Dyck

Oxford University Press

The topic of Kant’s Fourth Paralogism, the ideality of external objects, is not a topic of rational psychology. Yet, as is contended in this chapter, Kant’s purpose in locating a discussion of idealism in the context of his criticism of rational psychology is to draw attention to the psychological ground for this philosophical position. Accordingly, Kant claims that it is the metaphysician’s assumption that (the I of) the I think is actually in time that leads him to ask whether the objects of outer sense are actually in space, and he consequently commits himself to idealism insofar as he finds reason to doubt the latter. At the root of this mistaken belief is the illusory appearance of the soul which Kant characterizes in terms of confusing the I think with the I am, a misidentification famously captured in, and apparently warranted by, Descartes’ cogito, ergo sum.

Keywords:   Kant, Descartes, cogito, idealism, illusion, fourth paralogism

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .