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Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life$
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Derk Pereboom

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780199685516

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199685516.001.0001

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Free Will Skepticism and Rational Deliberation

Free Will Skepticism and Rational Deliberation

Chapter:
(p.104) 5 Free Will Skepticism and Rational Deliberation
Source:
Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life
Author(s):

Derk Pereboom

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199685516.003.0006

This chapter presents and defends an account of rational deliberation according to which it is compatible with believing the determinist version of skepticism about the sort of free will required for basic-desert moral responsibility. The position proposed is a version of the view that Tomis Kapitan has developed, which features both epistemic openness and deliberative efficacy conditions on rational deliberation. It also has much in common with Dana Nelkin’s compatibilism about rational deliberation, although it differs in its details from each of these views.

Keywords:   rational deliberation, deliberation-compatibilism, deliberation-incompatibilism, openness, deliberative efficacy

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