Assessing the role of comparative reasoning in the Czech legal system is a study in gaps. First, there is the gap between the practice in some of the courts, where comparative arguments are being made, especially in significant cases, and the standard legal theory, which is not able to account for such practice and conceptualize it. Secondly, there is the differentiation in the openness to comparative arguments between, on the one hand, the Ústavní soud and the Nejvyšší správní soud, and the Nejvyšší soud on the other. Both these gaps, caused by various aspects of the on-going legal transition, are discussed in detail.
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