Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Being Realistic about Reasons$

T. M. Scanlon

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780199678488

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199678488.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2017. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: null; date: 23 November 2017

(p.124) Bibliography

(p.124) Bibliography

Source:
Being Realistic about Reasons
Publisher:
Oxford University Press

Bibliography references:

Benacerraf, Paul, “Mathematical Truth,” in Benacerraf and Putnam, pp. 403–20.

—— and Hilary Putnam, eds, The Philosophy of Mathematics, second edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

Berker, Selim, “Particular Reasons,” Ethics 118 (2007), pp. 109–39.

Blackburn, Simon, “Errors and the Phenomenology of Value,” in Essays in Quasi-Realism, pp. 149–65.

—— Essays in Quasi-Realism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).

—— “How to be an Ethical Anti-Realist,” in Essays in Quasi-Realism, pp. 166–81.

—— “Moral Realism,” in Essays in Quasi-Realism, pp. 111–30.

—— Ruling Passions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

—— “Supervenience Revisited,” in Essays in Quasi-Realism, pp. 130–48.

Boolos, George, “Iteration Again,” Philosophical Topics 42 (1989), pp. 5–21.

—— “The Iterative Conception of Set,” in Benacerraf and Putnam, pp. 487–502.

Brandt, Richard, A Theory of the Good and the Right (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979).

Broome, John, “Does Rationality Consist in Responding Correctly to Reasons?,” Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (2007), pp. 349–74.

Burge, Tyler, Origins of Objectivity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2010).

Carnap, Rudolph, “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology,” in Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 205–21.

Cuneo, Terence, The Normative Web (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

Dancy, Jonathan, Ethics Without Principles (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

Davidson, Donald, “Actions, Reasons, and Causes,” in Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), pp. 3–19.

Dreier, Jamie, “Meta-ethics and the Problem of Creeping Minimalism,” Philosophical Perspectives 18 (2004), pp. 23–44.

Dworkin, Ronald, Justice for Hedgehogs (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011).

Egan, Andy, “Quasi-Realism and Fundamental Moral Error,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2007), pp, 205–19.

(p.125) Enoch, David, Taking Morality Seriously (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

Feferman, Solomon, “Conceptions of the Continuum,” Intellectica 51 (2009), pp. 169–89.

Field, Hartry, “Platonism for Cheap? Crispin Wright on Frege's Context Principle,” in his Realism, Mathematics and Modality (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), pp. 147–70.

Fine, Kit, “The Varieties of Necessity,” in Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne, eds, Conceivability and Possibility (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 253–81.

Foot, Philippa, Natural Goodness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

Freeman, Samuel, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Rawls (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

Gert, Joshua, Brute Rationality: Normativity and Human Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

—— “Normative Strength and the Balance of Reasons,” The Philosophical Review 116 (2007), pp. 533–62.

Gibbard, Allan, Thinking How to Live (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003).

—— Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990).

Gödel, Kurt, “What Is Cantor's Continuum Problem?,” in Benacerraf and Putnam, pp. 470–85.

Goodman, Nelson, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953).

Hare, R. M., The Language of Morals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952).

Harman, Gilbert, “Moral Relativism Defended,” Philosophical Review 84 (1975), pp. 3–22.

—— The Nature of Morality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977).

—— “Notes on Practical Reasoning,” <http://www.princeton.edu/~harman/Papers/SPAWN.pdf> (2007).

Hume, David, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968 (1739)).

Jackson, Frank, From Metaphysics to Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

Kelly, Thomas, “Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence,” in Richard Feldman and Ted A. Warfield, eds, Disagreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 111–74.

—— and Sarah McGrath, “Is Reflective Equilibrium Enough?,” Philosophical Perspectives 24 (2010), pp. 325–59.

Koellner, Peter, “Truth in Mathematics: The Question of Pluralism,” in Otávio Bueno and Øystein Linnebo, eds, New Waves in Philosophy of Mathematics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 80–116.

(p.126) Kolodny, Niko, “Aims as Reasons,” in Samuel Freeman, Rahul Kumar, and R. Jay Wallace, eds, Reasons and Recognition: Essays on the Philosophy of T. M. Scanlon (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 43–78.

Korsgaard, Christine, “Acting for a Reason,” in The Constitution of Agency, pp. 201–29.

—— The Constitution of Agency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

—— “The Normativity of Instrumental Reason,” in The Constitution of Agency, pp. 27–68.

—— Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

—— The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

Mackie, John, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977).

McDowell, John, “Non-Cognitivism and Rule Following,” in Steven Holzman and Christopher Leich, eds, Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule (London: Routledge, 1981), pp. 141–62.

—— “Values and Secondary Qualities,” in Ted Honderich, ed., Morality and Objectivity (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985), pp. 110–29.

Nagel, Thomas, The Possibility of Altruism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970).

—— The View from Nowhere (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).

Nietzsche, Friedrich, On the Genealogy of Morality, ed. Maudemarie Clark and Alan J. Swensen (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1998).

O’Neill, Onora, Constructions of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

Parfit, Derek, “Justifiability to Each Other,” in Philip Stratton-Lake, ed., On What We Owe to Each Other (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), pp. 67–89.

—— On What Matters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

Parsons, Charles, Mathematical Thought and Its Objects (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

—— “What Is the Iterative Conception of Set?,” in Benaceraf and Putnam, pp. 503–29.

Prior, A. N., “The Autonomy of Ethics,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 38 (1960), pp. 199–206.

Putnam, Hilary, The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002).

—— Ethics without Ontology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004).

Quine, Willard, The Pursuit of Truth (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990).

Quinn, Warren, “Putting Rationality in its Place,” in his Morality and Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 228–55.

(p.127) Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971).

—— Collected Papers, ed. Samuel Freeman (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).

—— “The Independence of Moral Theory,” in Collected Papers, pp. 286–302.

—— “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory,” in Collected Papers, pp. 303–58.

—— “An Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics,” in Collected Papers, pp. 1–19.

—— Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).

Raz, Joseph, Engaging Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

—— “Incommensurability and Agency,” in Engaging Reason, pp. 46–67.

—— The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).

—— “The Myth of Instrumental Rationality,” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1 (2005), pp. 1–28.

—— “Reasons: Practical and Adaptive,” in David Sobel and Steven Wall, eds, Reasons for Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 37–57.

Rippon, Simon, An Epistemological Argument for Moral Response-Dependence (PhD dissertation, Harvard University 2010).

Rosen, Gideon, “Blackburn's Essays in Quasi-Realism,” Nous 32 (1998), pp. 386–405.

Scanlon, T. M., “How I am not a Kantian,” in Parfit, On What Matters, Volume Two, pp. 116–39.

—— “Rawls on Justification,” in Freeman, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Rawls, pp. 139–67.

—— “Reasons: A Puzzling Duality?,” in R. Jay Wallace, Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler, and Michael Smith, eds, Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 231–46.

—— “Responsibility and the Value of Choice,” Think 12 (2013), pp. 9–16.

—— “Structural Irrationality,” in Geoffrey Brennan, Robert Goodin, Frank Jackson, and Michael Smith, eds, Common Minds: Essays in Honor of Philip Pettit (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 84–103.

—— “The Unity of the Normative,” Philosophical Studies 154 (2011), pp. 443–50.

—— What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998).

—— “Wrongness and Reasons: A Reexamination,” in Russ Shafer-Landau, ed., Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 5–20.

Schroeder, Mark, Slaves of the Passions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

Searle, John, The Construction of Social Reality (New York: The Free Press, 1995).

(p.128) Shoenfield, J. R. “Axioms of Set Theory,” in Jon Barwise, ed., Handbook of Mathematical Logic (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1977), pp. 321–44.

Skorupski, John, The Domain of Reasons (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2010).

Smith, Michael, The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1994).

—— “Objectivity and Moral Realism: On the Significance of the Phenomenology of Moral Experience,” in his Ethics and the A Priori: Selected Essays on Moral Psychology and Meta-Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 234–58.

Street, Sharon, “A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of   Value,” in Philosophical Studies 127 (2006), pp. 109–66.

—— “In Defense of Future Tuesday Indifference: Ideally Coherent Eccentrics and the Contingency of What Matters,” Philosophical Issues 19 (2009), pp. 273–98.

Tait, William W., “Beyond the Axioms: The Question of Objectivity in Mathematics,” in his The Provenance of Pure Reason, pp. 89–104.

—— The Provenance of Pure Reason: Essays in the Philosophy of Mathematics and Its History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

—— “Truth and Proof: The Platonism of Mathematics,” in his The Provenance of Pure Reason, pp. 61–88.

Thomson, Judith, Normativity (Peru, IL: Open Court Publishing, 2008).

Wallace, R. Jay, “Normativity and the Will,” in his Normativity & the Will: Selected Essays on Moral Psychology and Practical Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 71–81.

Williams, Bernard, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985).

—— “Internal and External Reasons,” in his Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 101–13.

—— “Replies,” in J. E. J. Altham and Ross Harrison, eds, World, Mind, and Ethics: Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 185–224.

Williamson, Timothy, The Philosophy of Philosophy (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2007).

Wright, Crispin, Frege's Conception of Numbers as Objects (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1983).

—— Truth and Objectivity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).