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Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 8$
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Russ Shafer-Landau

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199678044

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199678044.001.0001

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Properties for Nothing, Facts for Free? Expressivism’s Deflationary Gambit

Properties for Nothing, Facts for Free? Expressivism’s Deflationary Gambit

Chapter:
(p.223) 9 Properties for Nothing, Facts for Free? Expressivism’s Deflationary Gambit
Source:
Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 8
Author(s):

Terence Cuneo

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199678044.003.0009

Philosophers accept the deflationary package when they maintain that moral propositional content, properties, facts, and truth admit of a deflationary (or minimalist) treatment. Expressivists often present their position as if it were tailor made for the appropriation of the deflationary package, maintaining that adopting it would allow them to say just about everything that moral realists do without compromising their expressivism. It is not, however, easy to know whether this is true, as expressivists have said very little about what a deflationary account of moral properties would be. The project of this essay is to articulate such an account, which takes its inspiration from recent discussions about deflationism about truth, and to argue that expressivism does not fit well with it. The overall conclusion is that combining expressivism with deflationism is more challenging than many have assumed.

Keywords:   deflationism, expressivism, moral facts, moral properties, moral realism, truth

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