This chapter introduces the concept of a tempered expressivist theory, and comparatively discusses two forms such a theory may take. One of these two forms, hybrid expressivism, is familiar. But the other, relational expressivism, does not have clear precedents. A version of relational expressivism is developed that solves familiar problems for expressivism by strictly generalizing on hybrid expressivism. Such a view has the prospect to get many of the advantages of hybrid expressivism without incurring some of its distinctive commitments. But relational expressivism also comes with distinctive commitments of its own. One of the key upshots of the chapter is a better understanding of how far one can go in developing an expressivist theory with limited resources in the philosophy of mind.
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