Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 8$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Russ Shafer-Landau

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199678044

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199678044.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 17 January 2019

Believing in Expressivism

Believing in Expressivism

(p.252) 10 Believing in Expressivism
Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 8

Teemu Toppinen

Oxford University Press

This chapter outlines an expressivist account of the meaning of normative sentences, according to which normative sentences express higher-order (or relational) states of being in certain kinds of complex states consisting of both desire-like states (or ‘pro-attitudes’) and non-normative beliefs. First, this kind of higher-order state view or higher-order state expressivism (cf. relational expressivism) is introduced (section 1). It is then argued that this view can exploit the resources that ecumenical expressivism is sometimes supposed to have for dealing with the Frege–Geach problem (section 2), and yet avoid the problems with the ecumenical view regarding validity, expression relation, and normative disagreement (sections 3, 4, and 5).

Keywords:   expressivism, higher-order state view, relational expressivism, ecumenical expressivism, hybrid expressivism, Frege–Geach problem, validity, expression, disagreement, normative disagreement

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .