This chapter summarizes the main findings and suggests ways in which future work on the institutional design of newly democratizing societies might find them helpful. The chapter ends on a normative note as it links the empirical results with the notion of building a better system of parliamentary democracy. It suggests that to the extent that an ideal parliamentary democracy and an ideal party government includes (i) a combination of elections where meaningful choices are offered to the voters via more or less clearly defined government alternatives; (ii) the formation of governments that command a clear majority in the legislature and thus give full articulation to the principle of majority rule; (iii) the formation of stable governments; and iv) same party or coalition control over the head of government and the head of state, the most desirable institutional design is one that concentrates rather than disperses or divides political power because it encourages a clear articulation of majority rule and sustains a viable pattern party and coalition government.
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