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Common Goods and Evils?The Formation of Global Crime Governance$

Anja P. Jakobi

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199674602

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199674602.001.0001

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Appendix 5: Determining Set Relations

Appendix 5: Determining Set Relations

Source:
Common Goods and Evils?
Publisher:
Oxford University Press

The set relations presented in this book are generated as follows:

As the oldest of all crime policies presented in the book, maritime piracy had initially been combated by those major sea powers that had an interest in controlling the sea and making it safe for civil use. While definitions of piracy vary, the fight against it is centralized in the law of the sea. Only recent implementation efforts, caused by the upsurge of maritime piracy in Southeast Asia and Africa, have become more dispersed. In short, maritime piracy is partly caused by institutional entrepreneurship and, therefore, is classified with the value 0.5. Given states’ aim to control the sea, anti-piracy efforts are part of the set of rationalized policies, yet also contain prescriptive logics. Governance of maritime piracy is only a small part of the set of fragmented policies. As a result I classify maritime piracy with a rationalization value of 0.75 and a fragmentation value of 0.25. The second historical example is slavery, here categorized with an institutional entrepreneurship value of 0.50, a rationalization value of 0.00, and a fragmentation value of 0.50. Anti-slavery efforts were initiated by the British, and other states and non-state actors joined these efforts over time. It is a highly prescriptive policy, and slavery is nowadays banned in national and several international agreements, including those related to forced work.

Political crime has been a long-standing issue in global crime governance, but in contrast to maritime piracy and slavery, its meaning has changed significantly from (p.260) the early discussions of anarchism to today’s terrorism. The analysis here focuses on the latter, given that it is the most recent issue to emerge on international agendas. The increasing importance of terrorism was driven by the concerns of Western states, especially the United States. Terrorism is not part of the set of rationalized policies given the moral condemnation of terrorism. Fighting terrorism is also fragmented and part of the agenda of various international organizations, which have different ideas of what terrorism means. As a result, anti-terrorism has an institutional entrepreneurship value of 0.50, a rationalization value of 0.00, and a fragmentation value of 0.75.

Narcotic drugs were banned after the United States lobbied for their prohibition, and the main reason for this ban was moral concerns. Rationalized principles have only recently been involved, as drug abuse has been increasingly defined as a public health issue. Yet, anti-drug efforts have been widely coherent and show only a small degree of fragmentation. With regard to set relations, this results in a classification of an institutional entrepreneurship value of 1.00, a rationalization value of 0.00, and a fragmentation value of 0.25.

Anti-money laundering is the most extreme case in the set. It has become an important element of global crime governance, because of the United States’ explicit aim of setting a common standard. It is a highly rationalized policy and has nearly universally been targeted by the FATF and its regional bodies. As a consequence, the case has an institutional entrepreneurship and rationalization value of 1.00 and a fragmentation value of 0.00.

As in the cases of narcotic drugs and money laundering, the United States has also been an important institutional entrepreneur with regard to fighting corruption. Anti-corruption incorporates many elements of rationalized policies, especially its appeal to transparency and accountability. However, it has a slightly higher appeal to moral elements compared with money laundering as it is linked to prescriptive policies and it shows a higher degree of fragmentation to different international forums. It thus has an institutional entrepreneurship value of 1.0. It has a rationalization value of 0.75 and a fragmentation value of 0.50.

Other aspects of crime governance have been summarized under the umbrella term transnational organized crime, but this abstract concept is difficult to categorize. Nonetheless, one can analyze the different crimes separately. The illicit smuggling of migrants is a rationalized concept, and, given its importance on the national level, no strong institutional entrepreneurship has been visible in this case. Italy and Austria have, however, been proponents of the policy. The policy is rationalized in the sense that it focuses more on improving the control of migration flows and less on moral aspects. Moreover, the degree of fragmentation is low given the limited attempts to control or combat smuggling of migrants outside the UN protocol, for example, by the European Union. Accordingly, the illicit smuggling of migrants has an institutional entrepreneurship value of 0.25, a rationalization value of 0.75, and a fragmentation value of 0.25.

(p.261) The fight against human trafficking has also been put on the agenda without especially strong institutional entrepreneurship and, instead, was the result of efforts from non-state actors. The United States, while initially strong, was weakened in the course of events and has only remained important with regard to monitoring. The policy itself has a highly prescriptive character and is debated in moral terms. Fragmentation is high, because anti-trafficking policies have become part of many organizations and because of the presence of internal contradictions, especially in relation to prostitution. The relation to the set of institutional entrepreneurship is thus classified as 0.5, the relation to rationalization is 0.00, and fragmentation is 0.75.

Fighting the illicit trafficking of firearms, weapons components, and ammunition has been part of the UN efforts against transnational organized crime. In contrast to all the other cases here, the United States openly resisted these efforts despite its work as an institutional entrepreneur in other areas. While fighting illicit arms trafficking has mainly been motivated by prescriptive policies, there is also a strong element of control linked to it. Even after being supplemented with a UN program of action, however, anti-trafficking efforts remain modest and show fragmentation. Consequently, I classify institutional entrepreneurship of this case with 0.00, rationalization with 0.25, and fragmentation with 0.50.

Cybercrime is the most recent issue for global crime governance. Its regulation was originally promoted by the United States, yet these efforts have not yet resulted in a comprehensive global regulation and they remain as part of the regional policies of the Council of Europe. Governing cybercrime has a strongly rationalized appeal, yet prescriptive principles are involved with regard to securing citizens’ rights to free speech and information. The degree of fragmentation is medium, given that there is only one regulatory framework that partly addresses the current regulatory problems. This results in an institutional entrepreneurship value of 0.75, a rationalization value of 0.75, and a fragmentation value of 0.25.

These different values of the set are then used to analyze causality by reference to the idea of configurations. The question outlined before is whether a relation actually exists between the activities of institutional entrepreneurs and the decrease of fragmentation in the case of less rationalized policies. Operations on fuzzy sets are comparable to Venn diagrams and result in new groups. The logical ‘and’ is derived by taking the minimum value of the merged group, marking the degree of membership in the new, merged set. The logical ‘or’ is derived by taking the maximum of the memberships merged (Ragin 2000: 173–6). The fragmentation should be low in the case an institutional entrepreneur is present or a policy follows mainly rationalized principles. This hypothesis can be tested by comparing the set membership of the single cases in either of these two sets with the set membership related to fragmentation.

Table A-1 lists the different categories. Cases that are either part of the set of institutional entrepreneurship or the set of rationalized policies are classified as 0.50 or higher in merged categories. The threshold of 0.50 shows that no case is more external to any of these sets than internal.

(p.262)

Table A-1. Set Relations regarding Causal Factors

Institutional Entrepreneurship

Rationalization

Institutional Entrepreneur or Rationalization

Fragmentation

Maritime Piracy

0.50

0.75

0.75

0.25

Slavery

0.50

0.00

0.50

0.50

Terrorism

0.50

0.00

0.50

0.75

Narcotic Drugs

1.00

0.00

1.00

0.25

Money Laundering

1.00

1.00

1.00

0.00

Corruption

1.00

0.75

1.00

0.50

Migrant Smuggling

0.25

0.75

0.75

0.25

Human Trafficking

0.50

0.00

0.50

0.75

Illicit Arms Trafficking

0.00

0.25

0.25

0.50

Cybercrime

0.75

0.75

0.75

0.25

Source: author’s calculations.