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Consciousness and MeaningSelected Essays$
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Brian Loar, Katalin Balog, and Stephanie Beardman

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780199673353

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: February 2017

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199673353.001.0001

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Names in Thought

Names in Thought

(p.84) 5 Names in Thought
Consciousness and Meaning

Brian Loar

Oxford University Press

Kripke argued that his ‘strengthened disquotation principle’ together with certain other principles governing our de dicto belief ascriptions lead us in the case of puzzling Pierre to a contradiction. Loar objects that the strengthened disquotation principle is incorrect as Kripke states it, and that the corrected principle doesn’t lead to contradiction. Loar acknowledges that the principles we use to ascribe beliefs can lead us to accept both ‘Pierre believes that London is pretty’ and ‘Pierre believes that London is not pretty,’ but, he argues, this is a problem only if one assumes that ‘the function of de dicto ascriptions [is] to capture how believers conceive things.’ Loar’s real interest in Pierre is as a platform for elaborating his, Loar’s, views about the difference between the way names function in thought and the way they function in the ‘that’-clauses of belief reports.

Keywords:   Puzzling Pierre, Saul Kripke, proper names, belief, strengthened disquotation principle, de dicto belief ascriptions

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