Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
The Limits of Realism$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Tim Button

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199672172

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672172.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 19 December 2018

Vat variations

Vat variations

Chapter:
(p.149) 15 Vat variations
Source:
The Limits of Realism
Author(s):

Tim Button

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672172.003.0016

The brain-in-vat argument shows that there is nothing to fear from radical, nightmarish scepticism. However, the argument has its limits. To explore them, this chapter investigates several putative sceptical scenarios. Each scenario presents a way in which a theory could be undetectably false, but less than nightmarishly so. A brain-in-vat-style reply can be given to each. The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that whether brain-in-vat-style arguments succeed or fail is often vague. In the first instance, this shows that internal realism—the position which holds that every Cartesian sceptical scenario can be defeated—is untenable. This means that we shall need to locate ourselves somewhere between internal and external realism.

Keywords:   putnam’s brain-in-vat argument, cartesian scepticism, scepticism about space, scepticism about time, vat earth, vat variations

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .