Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
The Limits of Realism$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Tim Button

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199672172

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672172.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 15 December 2018

The just-more-theory manœuvre

The just-more-theory manœuvre

Chapter:
(p.27) 4 The just-more-theory manœuvre
Source:
The Limits of Realism
Author(s):

Tim Button

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672172.003.0005

Since Putnam wants to undercut the entire picture of external realism, he cannot present piecemeal attacks on various attempts to constrain reference. Instead, he presents a completely general manoeuvre for dismissing all interpretative constraints: his just-more-theory manoeuvre. Putnam is often accused of question-begging, but he is best understood as raising a dilemma against the external realist’s attempts to constraint reference. On the one hand, if their ‘constraints’ have empirical content, then they are indeed just-more-theory. In that case, they cannot constrain reference after all. On the other hand, if they are supposed to constrain reference, then they will be bereft of empirical content.

Keywords:   interpretative constraint, just-more-theory manoeuvre, question-begging, magical Constraint, empirical content, external realism, putnam’s model-theoretic arguments

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .