Taking Religious Disagreement Seriously
Taking Religious Disagreement Seriously
This chapter considers what rationality requires when there is disagreement over religious propositions between those who regard one another (or should regard one another) as epistemic peers. The chapter rejects prominent conceptions of epistemic peerhood that would countenance religious believers and non-believers simply continuing without belief revision despite encountered disagreement. These conceptions in one way or other allow for defining all those with differing opinions as non-peers, which would have the implication that there are no genuinely interesting instances of religious disagreement. Instead, Lackey proposes that atheists and theists should regard each other as epistemic peers if they should regard each other as equally justified in their respective beliefs.
Keywords: rationality, disagreement, epistemic peer, belief, theism, revision, justification
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