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The Aim of Belief$
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Timothy Chan

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199672134

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672134.001.0001

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Against Belief Normativity

Against Belief Normativity

Chapter:
(p.80) 5 Against Belief Normativity
Source:
The Aim of Belief
Author(s):

Kathrin Glüer

Åsa Wikforss

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672134.003.0005

Normativism about belief is a claim about the nature of belief: Belief is essentially norm- or rule-guided. This is standardly interpreted as requiring that belief formation be subject to genuine prescriptions. In this chapter, Glüer and Wikforss argue that belief normativism is very hard to square with some basic intuitions about rule guidance. Any account of rule-guidance needs to support the distinction between being guided by a rule and merely being in accord with it. But belief normativism cannot account for this difference in what the authors take to be the most natural, intuitive terms. If this is correct, any defense of normativism will have to involve a significant departure from intuition or a novel construal of the normativity involved. The challenge is to motivate any of these moves.

Keywords:   aim of belief, norm, normativity, rationality, rule-guidance, truth

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