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Causality and MindEssays on Early Modern Philosophy$
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Nicholas Jolley

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199669554

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199669554.001.0001

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Leibniz and Phenomenalism

Leibniz and Phenomenalism

Chapter:
(p.183) 12 Leibniz and Phenomenalism
Source:
Causality and Mind
Author(s):

Nicholas Jolley

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199669554.003.0013

This chapter addresses the question whether Leibniz became a phenomenalist in his later years when he was committed to an idealist ontology. In opposition to Furth and Loeb it is argued that he did not. Although Leibniz flirted with phenomenalist ideas on occasion, he never truly accepted them; on the contrary, he maintained a rival reductionist thesis to the effect that bodies are in some sense aggregates of monads. However, this conclusion raises difficulties of its own, for in certain respects phenomenalism seems like the more attractive option; for instance, phenomenalism dispenses with the veil of perception. It is argued that Leibniz’s reluctance to accept phenomenalism must be explained in terms of his goal of reconciling monadology and physics

Keywords:   Aggregates of monads, Furth, idealism, Loeb, phenomenalism, veil of perception

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