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Transparent MindsA Study of Self-Knowledge$
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Jordi Fernández

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199664023

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199664023.001.0001

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Moore’s Paradox and Self-Knowledge

Moore’s Paradox and Self-Knowledge

Chapter:
(p.111) 4 Moore’s Paradox and Self-Knowledge
Source:
Transparent Minds
Author(s):

Jordi Fernández

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199664023.003.0004

This chapter offers a solution to Moore's paradox. The chapter distinguishes the omissive and commissive forms of the paradox, it discusses some solutions to the paradox in the literature, and it argues that no available solution can tackle both versions of the paradox successfully. An appeal is then made to the view, defended in chapter 2, that our grounds for believing a proposition P are identical with our reasons for self-attributing the belief that P. In that case, it is argued, someone who had a Moore-paradoxical belief with the structure ‘P and I believe that not-P’ would be epistemically negligent: She would believe that P despite having grounds for believing that not-P. Similarly, someone who had a Moore-paradoxical belief with the structure ‘P and I do not believe that P’ would also be epistemically negligent: She would believe that P despite having no grounds for believing that P.

Keywords:   self-knowledge, Moore's paradox, omissive, commissive, grounds, epistemic negligence

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