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Transparent MindsA Study of Self-Knowledge$
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Jordi Fernández

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199664023

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199664023.001.0001

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Self-Knowledge for Desire

Self-Knowledge for Desire

(p.79) 3 Self-Knowledge for Desire
Transparent Minds

Jordi Fernández

Oxford University Press

This chapter proposes an account of self-knowledge for desire according to which we attribute desires to ourselves based on our grounds for those desires. It is argued that this ‘bypass’ view explains our privileged access to our own desires, and the transparency of desire. Analogously to the case of belief, the main tenet of the chapter is that some of our mental states constitute our grounds for our desires as well as our reasons for self-attributing those desires. This allows the bypass view to accommodate the intuition that, in self-knowledge, a self-attribution of a desire constitutes a cognitive achievement. It also leaves room for error in our self-attributions of desires. The second part of the chapter defends the bypass view from several compelling objections.

Keywords:   self-knowledge, besire, bypass, grounds, reasons, privileged access, transparency, cognitive achievement

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