Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Mental Files$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

François Recanati

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199659982

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199659982.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 21 May 2018

Can Descriptivism Account for Singularity?

Can Descriptivism Account for Singularity?

Chapter:
(p.15) 2 Can Descriptivism Account for Singularity?
Source:
Mental Files
Author(s):

François Recanati

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199659982.003.0002

Various attempts to account for singular thought within a (refined) descriptivist framework are discussed and criticized. Rigidity and truth-conditional singularity can be achieved in a two-dimensional framework (with the help of actuality operators), but the relational character of reference determination keeps missing from the descriptivist picture even after the two-dimensional move. It is still missing even if we make the descriptive content token-reflexive by ‘internalizing’ the acquaintance relations and letting them be represented.

Keywords:   descriptivism, singular thought, two-dimensional semantics, rigidity, actuality operators, relational/satisfactional, internalization of acquaintance relations

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .