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Scepticism and Perceptual Justification$
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Dylan Dodd and Elia Zardini

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780199658343

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: June 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658343.001.0001

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Confirming the Less Likely, Discovering the Unknown

Confirming the Less Likely, Discovering the Unknown

Dogmatisms—Surd and Doubly Surd, Natural, Flat and Doubly Flat*

Chapter:
(p.33) 3 Confirming the Less Likely, Discovering the Unknown
Source:
Scepticism and Perceptual Justification
Author(s):

Elia Zardini

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658343.003.0003

The chapter proposes that, contrary intuitions notwithstanding, dogmatists accept a variety of Moorean arguments as legitimate ways to acquire a justification for their conclusions. The chapter counters an ensuing objection from Bayesian confirmation theory, arguing by way of example that acquisition of justification is compatible with the probability lowering that Bayesian confirmation theory predicts to take place in many Moorean arguments. Appealing to considerations concerning defeat, it then shows that a minimal strengthening of dogmatism is incompatible with the classical, additive theory of the very structure of probabilities, and it consequently investigates a more dogmatist-friendly non-classical, super-additive theory of both the structure and dynamics of probabilities, in which the probability of the conclusion of a Moorean argument rises no less than the probability of its premise, and in which perception can play this epistemic role without either presupposing or directly contributing justification for a principle linking appearances with reality.

Keywords:   additivity, Bayesian confirmation theory, defeat, dogmatism, ignorance, Moorean arguments, transmission

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