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Scepticism and Perceptual Justification
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Scepticism and Perceptual Justification

Dylan Dodd and Elia Zardini

Abstract

One of the hardest problems in the history of western philosophy has been the problem of explaining whether and how experience can provide knowledge (or even justification) for believing that the objective world outside the experiencer’s mind is thus and so. A prominent brand of scepticism has precisely denied that experience can provide such knowledge. How—these sceptics for instance ask—can I know that my experiences are not produced in me by a powerful demon (or, in a modern twist on that traditional Cartesian scenario, by a supercomputer)? This volume, originating from the research project ... More

Keywords: appearances, certainty, epistemic/pragmatic distinction, evidence, inference, justification, knowledge, perception, probability, scepticism

Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 2014 Print ISBN-13: 9780199658343
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: June 2014 DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658343.001.0001

Authors

Affiliations are at time of print publication.

Dylan Dodd, editor
University of Alaska, Anchorage

Elia Zardini, editor
University of Barcelona and University of Aberdeen

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Contents

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Front Matter

1 Introduction

Dylan Dodd, and Elia Zardini

Prelude: Past Scepticism in the Light of Present Epistemology

I The Immediacy of the Senses

5 E & ¬H*

Jonathan Vogel

6 Inference and Scepticism*

José L. Zalabardo

8 Consciousness, Attention, and Justification*

Susanna Siegel, and Nicholas Silins

II The Dependency of the Senses

9 On Epistemic Alchemy*

Aidan McGlynn

III The Evidence of the Senses