This chapter explains how memory loss creates problems for Conditionalization, the traditional Bayesian norm for updating degrees of belief. It first presents stories in which agents suffer from memory loss (or the threat thereof) and shows how these stories are counterexamples to Conditionalization. It then argues that memory loss does indicate a failure of rationality on the part of the agent. The chapter then presents a new updating norm, Generalized Conditionalization (GC), which properly handles memory loss stories. GC is applied to a somewhat more complex story in which memory loss occurs multiple times, then the norm is used to derive a generalized version of Bas van Fraassen’s Reflection Principle applying to cases in which agents both gain and lose information.
Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.