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Quitting CertaintiesA Bayesian Framework Modeling Degrees of Belief$
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Michael G. Titelbaum

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199658305

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658305.001.0001

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Three common objections to Bayesian frameworks

Three common objections to Bayesian frameworks

(p.84) 5 Three common objections to Bayesian frameworks
Quitting Certainties

Michael G. Titelbaum

Oxford University Press

This chapter shows how the Certainty-Loss Framework (CLF) and its interpretation developed in the previous two chapters offers new responses to traditional objections to Subjective Bayesianism. First, it explains exactly when a case counts as a counterexample to a formal modeling framework. Second, it applies CLF to Bas van Fraassen’s Judy Benjamin Problem and the more general problem of new theories, in which an agent comes to consider hypotheses she hadn’t entertained before. Third, the chapter takes up objections to the Ratio Formula relating conditional and unconditional degrees of belief (along the way explaining exactly what it is to assign a conditional degree of belief). Finally, the chapter assesses Bayesianism’s commitment to logical omniscience, the implausible rational requirement that agents be certain of all logical truths. The chapter explains how much logical omniscience CLF is committed to, and whether a little such commitment is necessarily a bad thing.

Keywords:   Bayesianism, modeling, ratio formula, logical omniscience, conditionalization, Judy Benjamin, new theories, degrees of belief, Certainty-Loss Framework

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