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Quitting CertaintiesA Bayesian Framework Modeling Degrees of Belief$
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Michael G. Titelbaum

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199658305

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658305.001.0001

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Models and norms

Models and norms

(p.11) 2 Models and norms
Quitting Certainties

Michael G. Titelbaum

Oxford University Press

This chapter is about formal models, norms, and their relations. It first discusses bridge principles, which relate a formal model to the domain it is meant to model. For example, bridge principles relate the probability axioms in a Bayesian model to rational requirements on degrees of belief. Next, the chapter lays out the elements needed to engage in formal modeling: the modeling framework itself, bridge principles, and modeling rules to tell you when and how a framework is used. These elements are illustrated by considering deduction systems in logic as formal modeling frameworks. Finally, the chapter discusses the modeling methodology of this book and its advantages, especially in how counterexamples are treated and how a modeling outlook encourages one to be explicit about the choices made in building a model.

Keywords:   modeling, normativity, logic, deduction, Bayesianism, bridge principles

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