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Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume 4$
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Jonathan Kvanvig

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199656417

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199656417.001.0001

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Wittgensteinian Quasi‐Fideism

Wittgensteinian Quasi‐Fideism

Chapter:
(p.144) 8 Wittgensteinian Quasi‐Fideism
Source:
Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume 4
Author(s):

Duncan Pritchard

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199656417.003.0008

This chapter offers a moderate fideistic account of the epistemology of religious belief, one that takes on board the account of the structure of reasons offered by Wittgenstein in On Certainty. Like standard forms of fideism, this position holds that the theist's belief in God's existence is lacking in rational support. Unlike standard forms of fideism, however, this position also holds that most religious beliefs can nonetheless enjoy rational support.

Keywords:   epistemology, religious belief, reasons, On Certainty, theism, God

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